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"WHO ARE YOU TO TELL ME THAT?":
ATTORNEY-CLIENT DELIBERATION
REGARDING NONLEGAL ISSUES AND
THE INTERESTS OF NONCLIENTS
PETER MARGULIESt
Do lawyers have a duty to counsel their clients about nonlegal issues and
nonclient interests? Currently, only vague, subjective standards exist in
these areas, and lawyers seem unwilling to discharge these duties on
their own initiative. In this Article Professor Peter Margulies proposes
specific rules of professional responsibility that would require lawyers to
deliberate with their clients regarding both the interests of third-party
nonclients and the moral, policy, and psychological consequences of
legal action. The author believes that a framework for deliberation with
rich and poor clients may lead to less costly, more informal means of
dispute resolution with less manipulation of the client.
Nonlegal issues and the interests of nonclients always have been neglected
stepchildren of the American legal profession. Lawyers and codes governing
lawyers' behavior bow absentmindedly in the direction of counseling clients re-
garding issues other than legal ones and interests other than the client's.I Com-
mentators wax nostalgic about the warm public spirits of attorneys past.
2
However, individual lawyers have been left alone to discern their professional
responsibilities in these areas.
The result of this neglect has been a gap in deliberation regarding the
moral, policy, and psychological consequences of legal action. This gap has pro-
duced a landscape of legalism populated by advocates for rich and poor alike
t Visiting Professor, City University of New York Law School at Queens College; B.A. 1978,
Colgate University; J.D. 1981, Columbia University. I thank Steve Ellmann, Bruce Green, Michael
Perlin, Ellen Saideman, and the participants in the Columbia Clinical Theory Workshop and the
UCLA-Warwick International Clinical Conference for their comments on this paper.
1. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility permits the lawyer to counsel the client on
nonlegal issues and nonclient issues. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8
(1982). The Code recommends that the lawyer "should bring to bear... the fullness of his experi-
ence." Id. The Code also concedes that it is "often desirable for a lawyer to point out those factors
which may lead to a decision that is morally just as well as legally permissible." Id. In addition, the
lawyer may "emphasize the possibility of harsh consequences that might result from assertion of
legally permissible positions." Id. Beyond these encouraging words, the Code offers little guidance.
2. See, eg., Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U.L. REv. 1, 11-16 (1988); Luban,
The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practice of Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 717 (1988); Simon, Babbitt
v. Brandeis7 The Decline of the Professional Ideal, 37 STAN. L. REV. 565 (1985). These articles do
not argue that the average practitioner of the turn of the century was more public-minded than
contemporary lawyers. These authors do contend, however, that professional ideals, as embodied by
the pillars of the profession-Louis Brandeis is the example overwhelmingly cited--encompassed
more civic-mindedness then than now. Cf. Garth, Independent Professional Power and the Search
for a Legal Ideology with a Progressive Bite, 62 IND. L.J. 183 (1987) (seeking avenues for implement-
ing progressive agenda, with emphasis on income redistribution, through concerted action of con-
temporary lawyers).
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cultivating rights, remedies, and defenses. The cultivation does not necessarily
nourish social interests, including the interests of the poor population that sup-
posedly benefits from the possession of legal rights. This Article outlines a mod-
est initiative to introduce or recall deliberation about nonlegal issues3 and
nonclient interests4 to the attorney-client dialogue.
The Article argues that lawyers have a professional responsibility to counsel
their clients on issues of morality, policy, and-in certain situations-psychol-
ogy. The Article also contends that lawyers have a duty to counsel their clients
regarding the effect of legal decisions on nonclients, even though fulfillment of
the duty may compromise the private attorney's current obligation to represent
her client zealously. Finally, the Article asserts that lawyers will not discharge
these suggested duties if left to their own devices. To overcome this problem of
compliance, along with the companion problems of vagueness and subjectivity of
standards for counseling on nonlegal issues and the interests of nonclients, the
Article suggests a number of specific guidelines for use in discharging these
duties.
The content of these guidelines, in addition to their specificity, sets this
Article's approach apart from other scholarship in professional responsibility.
Some commentators endorse the premise that lawyers should advise clients
about nonlegal issues and effects on nonclients,5 although other commentators
3. "Nonlegal" issues means issues apart from the narrow discussion of whether a client will
prevail on a given legal point before a given tribunal and what the client can do to maximize her
chances of prevailing. A gray area exists, of course, between such nonlegal issues and issues involv-
ing morality and policy that a court or agency may consider as an ingredient of its decisionmaking.
The tradition of equity and equitable interpretation, in particular, always has been open to questions
beyond those posed by preexisting legal doctrine. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200
(1973) ("equitable remedies are a special blend of what is necessary, what is fair, and what is worka-
ble" (footnote omitted)); see also Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and
Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 802-35 (1985) (outlining the historical development of the
equitable interpretation of statutes from Blackstone to the present); Marcin, Epleikela; Equitable
Lawmaking in the Construction of Statutes, 10 CONN. L. REv. 377 (1978) (outlining the historical
development of the equitable interpretation of statutes from the time of the ancient Greeks to the
present); Margulies, Stranger and Afraid: Undocumented Workers and Federal Employment Law, 38
DE PAUL L. REV. 553, 614-15 & nn.183-86 (1989) (discussing different incarcerations of equity).
Typically, however, courts are free to ignore these nondoctrinal considerations or to employ them in
a freewheeling fashion. This absence of a consistent approach accounts for the Article's classification
of moral, psychological, and policy issues as nonlegal.
4. "Nonclient" interests are the interests of anyone who is not the immediate client of the
lawyer. Nonclients, under this definition, could include people close to the client, such as family
members. Here, there is some overlap between nonclients and nonlegal interests. A client may care
about the effect a legal decision has on her family, even if that effect is not, strictly speaking, a legal
effect related to how a court will look at the client's case, but rather an effect rooted in the personal
ties between the client and her family. Nonclients can be identifiable persons, such as the opposite
party in litigation or a creditor seeking to recover on a debt owed by the client. Nonclients also can
be specific groups in society, such as those persons suffering from mental illness who may at some
point require institutionalization to meet their needs, even though one's client as a mental health
lawyer might be only one person or class of persons currently institutionalized in a particular facil-
ity. The interests of nonclient societal groups might or might not coincide with the long-term inter-
ests of one's client. Finally, under this Article's formulation, a nonclient could be society as a whole.
5. See, eg., Freedman, Legal Ethics and the Suffering Client, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 331, 332
(1987); Luban, supra note 2; Morris, Power and Responsibility Among Lawyers and Clients: Com-
ment on Ellmann's Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 781, 792-94 (1987); Penegar, The Five
Pillars of Professionalism, 49 U. PiTr. L. REv. 307, 372-89 (1988); Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral
Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 613, 630-
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advocate powerful opposing positions.6 Existing commentary, however, suffers
from two flaws. First, commentators leave to lawyers' discretion and prudence
the difficult task of what to say to the client to provoke a useful discussion of
nonlegal issues and nonclient interests.7 Second, commentators are content to
discuss nonlegal issues and nonclient interests in terms of amorphous invoca-
tions of morality and time-honored dichotomies of altruism and greed. This
Article endeavors to remedy both flaws. The Article offers concrete guidance on
issues of policy and psychology, as well as morality. In addition, the Article
treats obligations to consider nonlegal issues and the interests of nonclients as
binding even when legal representation, as with representation of the poor, in-
volves an act of altruism. Altruism, according to the Article's thesis, has worth
only when deliberation accompanies it. Ultimately, the Article attempts to de-
fine a framework for deliberation with rich and poor clients that will lead to less
costly, more informal means for resolving disputes. In the process, the Article
articulates an approach to counseling that relies less on manipulation of the
client.
The Article is in four parts. Part I makes the case for rules governing delib-
eration about nonlegal issues and nonclient interests. Part II outlines the sug-
gested bases for deliberation about morality, psychology, and policy. Part III
explains and justifies these suggestions, and Part IV examines possible criticisms
of the model.
I. THE CASE FOR RULES
Every day, lawyers and clients make decisions that do violence8 to others
and create harshness and suffering, through the assertion of positions sanctioned
by law. The rich and avaricious use lawyers and legal entitlements to enhance
their power, often at the expense of the vulnerable poor and the rest of society.
32; Shaffer, The Unique, Novel, and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41 VAND. L. REV. 697 (1988); Simon,
The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29. See
generally Brown & Brown, What Counsels the Counselor? The Code of Professional Responsibility's
Ethical Considerations-A Preventive Law Analysis, 10 VAL. U.L. REV. 453 (1976) (discussing im-
portance of counseling, as distinguished from advocacy role of lawyers).
6. See, e.g., D. BINDER & S. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-
CENTERED APPROACH (1977) (describing nonjudgmental approach oriented toward expressing em-
pathy with the client's situation); G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 14749 (1978)
(urging lawyers to refrain from giving moral or policy advice, but instead to give "peremptory" legal
advice if client's proposed action is flagrantly immoral). For a vigorous debate on the propriety of
counseling the client about nonlegal issues and nonclient interests, see A. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 267-85 (1976) (setting out two opposing views).
7. See, e.g., D. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 348-51 (1988); Luban, The Lysistratian Pre-
rogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 AM B. FOUND. RES. J. 637, 640-43; Simon, Ethical
Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1090-1119 (1988). On the subject of rules chiefly
governing discussion of legal issues with clients, compare Spiegel, The New Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct: Lawyer-Client Decision Making and the Role of Rules in Structuring the Lawyer-
Client Dialogue, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1003 [hereinafter The Role of Rules] (expressing
skepticism about utility of rules) with Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Con-
sent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41 (1979) [hereinafter Informed Consent] (propos-
ing model of rules).
8. See Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986) (discussing power of
courts to deprive persons of their life, liberty, and property; asserting that "[n]either legal interpreta-
tion nor the violence it occasions may be properly understood apart from one another").
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To a lesser degree, the assertion of legal rights by the poor and vulnerable may
compound the problems of this population, rather than alleviate the difficulties
that they face in a complex world. In each case, legal considerations-the pros-
pects of recovery of some kind, be it monetary or injunctive-fail to ensure the
vindication of nonlegal or nonclient interests.
Lawyers can deal with these problems. Because the relationship of lawyer
and client evolves in a nonpublic setting, lawyers have the flexibility to urge
restraint in the pursuit of legally correct positions when heedless assertion of
these positions would cause suffering for others or create costs to the public.9
This flexibility also permits lawyers to respond to individual situations without
the inhibitions produced by a need to formulate comprehensive rules.' 0 In addi-
9. Public entities such as courts and legislatures must worry that relaxing legal obligations to
avoid harsh results in specific cases will encourage the public generally to take advantage by flouting
obligations under law. See infra notes 33 & 36 (discussing problem of moral hazard-the promotion
of irresponsible or socially undesirable behavior-created when various forms of insurance are avail-
able to cushion impact of default on legal, social, or business obligations); cf. Dan-Cohen, Decision
Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 630-34
(1984) (discussing rules as guides to conduct eviscerated by public knowledge of courts' freedom in
departing from rules). An example of this phenomenon can be drawn from the criteria for evictions
under landlord-tenant law. Evictions by definition result in harshness and suffering to tenants. They
also often result in a greater burden on the public, which must pay to provide accommodations to
evicted tenants who have become homeless. The visible tragedy and waste of homelessness might
create some temptation for courts or legislatures, if tenant influence balanced out the political clout
and money of real estate interests, to narrow or even abolish the criteria for eviction. Cf. Lorne, The
Corporate and Securities Adviser, the Public Interest, and Professional Ethics, 76 MICH. L. REV. 425,
428-29 (1978) (contrasting appeal of proposed requirement that lawyers disclose client wrongdoing
with less visible danger that disclosure requirement will inhibit client communication with attor-
neys); infra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing impact of salient stimuli, i.e., those facts with
strong emotional content or imagery). If tenants were aware of this trend to curb evictions, however,
as rational economic actors on a tight budget they might experience some temptation to stop paying
rent. This response by tenants would not promote provision of services by landlords and might
encourage abandonment of rental properties.
Freedom from eviction in cases of nonpayment of rent is arguably one kind of insurance. Other
kinds of less drastic ameliorative measures for tenants, such as increased housing allowances in
government benefits, or the provision of lawyers in all eviction cases, see Shipp, Lawsuit Seeks Aid
for Poor in Evictions, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1989, at 31, col. 5, may alleviate harshness for the most
vulnerable tenants without raising moral hazard problems that rise to the same level as those engen-
dered by the limiting or abolition of eviction. Government may not believe, however, that it pos-
sesses sufficient revenues and resources to implement even these basic reforms. In this situation,
seeking some way to promote landlord self-restraint (although that may be an oxymoron) on a case-
specific basis may be the only alternative to the present eviction epidemic.
10. See Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking,
89 HARV. L. REV. 637 (1976) [hereinafter Private Ordering] (analyzing characteristics and advan-
tages of nonadjudicative means for resolving controversies). See generally Eisenberg, Participation,
Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process: An Essay forLon Fuller, 92 HARV. L. REV. 410 (1978)
[hereinafter The Consultative Process] (discussing difficulty of formulating rules and adjudicative
procedures that would take into account multiple interests and variables present in many disputes);
Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978) (analyzing what types
of problems should be settled by adjudication and the ways in which adjudication should be con-
ducted).
A pervasive problem is that courts and legislatures cannot devise legal categories sufficiently
precise to cope with all contingencies. Devising categories to accommodate each new set of facts is
time-consuming and expensive. See G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970) (discussing
cost advantages of broader categories for assessing risks in insurance); R. EPSTEIN, TAKINoS: PRI-
VATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 312-14 (1985) (describing process by
which insurers devise group classifications, and the adverse consequences of judicial invalidation of
the use of sex-based mortality tables in determining pension benefits); Diver, The Optimal Precision
of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 66 (1983) (describing the difficulty in formulating i rule
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tion, lawyers in the exercise of their counseling function are relatively free from
problems of resource and revenue scarcity that afflict governments dealing with
massive social problems.1I Moreover, lawyers have access to client information
hidden from courts and legislatures.
1 2
The advantages of individual lawyers over more public entities such as
courts and legislatures contrast with the reluctance of attorneys to exploit these
advantages. Lawyers tend to avoid discussion of morality, policy, and psychol-
ogy.1 3 The bar is always ready with a ritual recital of reasons for this reticence:
issues of client autonomy, 14 lawyer competence, 15 and the intrinsic uncertainty
of nonlegal questions1 6 loom large.
These issues are far from frivolous. Their ritual invocation does not, how-
ever, inspire faith that the bar has reflected carefully and dispassionately on its
role, or has explored fully the reasons for its reluctance to address nonlegal is-
sues and the interests of nonclients. The bar's failure to deliberate about the
sources of this reluctance highlights the need for rules governing the attorney's
role in counseling clients about nonclient interests and nonlegal issues.
that will have the results intended by its drafters). Modifying a rule to accommodate new facts likely
will result in other fact patterns being covered or omitted inappropriately. See Fischhoff, For Those
Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCER-
TAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 335, 339, 345-47 (1982) [hereinafter JUDGMENT UNDER UNCER-
TAINTY] (discussing problems created by seeking to adjust rules in reaction to perceived past
failures); see also Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv.
1685 (1976) (noting that rules are typically either overinclusive, i.e., they include situations which
they should not cover, or underinclusive, i.e., they omit situations that they should cover); cf. R.
NISBETr & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDG-
MENT 32-41 (1980) (describing benefits and drawbacks of our use of categories as bases for
inference).
11. See supra note 9 (discussing why lawyer counseling of landlord client may be only alterna-
tive in jurisdiction unwilling to spend money on lawyers for tenants or on increased housing
allowances).
12. Lawyers' superior access to information makes it much easier for them than for courts or
legislatures to respond to the hypothetical of the just claim barred by the statute of limitations. See
infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. The lawyer for the defendant knows whether the claim is
just; her client has told her. She can urge the client to pay some amount to the plaintiff to compen-
sate him for his loss, and to obviate the possibility that the plaintiff without compensation will have
to turn to government for assistance in meeting basic needs. Courts, by contrast, cannot find out
whether the claim is meritorious without adjudicating the matter. Such adjudication would defeat
the purpose of the statute of limitations as a means of promoting repose. In addition, public aware-
ness of the court's decision to adjudicate untimely claims would encourage tardy commencement of
actions. See supra note 9 (discussion of problem in landlord-tenant context); infra notes 33 & 36
(discussing problem of moral hazard).
13. See Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social Values and Client Rela-
tionships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REv. 503, 531-39 (1985) (discussing results of study).
14. See infra note 115; see also Donagan, Justifying Legal Practice in the Adversary System, in
THE GOOD LAWYER 123, 126-33 (D. Luban ed. 1983) (examining claim that representing client's
interests despite moral reservations enhances individual autonomy); Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on
Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 605-17 (1985) (same).
15. See Rhode, supra note 14, at 617-20 (discussing lawyers' tendency to avoid questions of
morality encountered in legal practice).
16. See infra note 48 and accompanying text; see also Donagan, supra note 14, at 130, 132
(describing inevitable differences among personal views of morality); Rhode, supra note 14, at 620-23
(discussing lawyers' "appeal to agnosticism" with regard to what position best vindicates the public
interest); Schwartz, The "New" Legal Ethics and the Administrative Law Bar, in THE GOOD LAW-
YER, supra note 14, at 236, 242-43 (describing lack of moral consensus on issues involving degree of
appropriate regulation engaged in by administrative agencies).
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The need for rules stems from defects in the process of lawyer-client inter-
action. 17 The first and most conspicuous defect is that attorneys often have in-
centives derived from pecuniary or psychic incbme that submerge the interests
of nonclients.18 Many people go into law because they seek status and material
wealth.19 The pursuit of such rewards does not necessarily achieve results con-
17. This is a pervasive rationale for rules. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability. One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1115-24 (1972) (dis-
cussing need for rules in situations in which relying on individual decisionmaking would be too
costly); infra note 112 (discussing role of government as compensating for atomization born of wel-
ter of individual choices, free rider problems, etc.); see also Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102
HARv. L. REV. 375, 419-29 (1988) (rule creating presumption that cessation of treatment is appro-
priate in right to die cases is necessary to counteract protreatment bias of medical profession); cf.
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (justifying judicial review as
device for compensating for underrepresentation of certain groups in political process); J. ELY, DE-
MOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (same). But see R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 57-69
(1985) (debunking process-based theory as self-defeating flight from difficult task of devising sub-
stantive standards and norms). The notion of using rules to correct failures in process is also impor-
tant in the criminal and quasi-criminal law. See, e.g., Margulies, The "Pandemonium Between the
Mad and the Bad:" Procedures for the Commitment and Release of Insanity Acquittees After Jones v.
United States, 36 RtrGERS L. REV. 793, 823 n.183 (1984) (asserting that Supreme Court's setting of
burden and standard of proof in cases involving commitment of insanity acquittees that disadvan-
tages acquittees is unnecessary and prejudicial since, factfinder at commitment hearing already will
be wary of favoring acquittee because of factfinder's knowledge of acquittee's underlying criminal
act). See generally Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Crimi-
nal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1337 (1977) (discussing rationale for burdens of proof and
persuasion).
18. In this respect, the public may be getting the lawyers that it deserves. Society rarely judges
an attorney to be successful when she protects the interests of society as a whole, unless she also
happens to score a killing for her client. Even Louis Brandeis arguably is remembered as an exem-
plar of the spirit of public service and civic mindedness because he in effect had his cake and ate it,
too. Brandeis was successful on behalf of his clients and was well paid for the exercise of his talents.
He also was successful as a protector of the public interest. A lawyer without Brandeis' combination
of worldly and eleemosynary victories might not be similarly revered. Cf. Luban, supra note 2, at
720 ("To many lawyers Brandeis is still the ideal of what greatness is: worldly success combined
with public service.").
19. It is no coincidence that two of the more provocative works about the practice of law in the
last 15 years end with the word "money." See G. HAZARD, supra note 6, at 153 ("Then, of course,
there is the money."); Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 876 (1987) ("Will it be
possible, in the world of law that I fear is growing up around us, to answer someone who asks why
he should choose a living in the law or think of it as anything more than a way of passing time and
making money?"). It is true that as a normative matter one might be able to formulate other justifi-
cations for the practice of law, even without embracing the notion of law as a mode of public service.
This venture is at the core of Professor Kronman's enterprise, which isolates cultivation of judg-
ment, defined as the simultaneous application of sympathy and detachment, as the purpose of prac-
ticing law. Professor Kronman agrees, however, that as a descriptive matter, prestige and mammon
exert a great attraction for prospective lawyers. Kronman, supra, at 838.
Even public interest and legal services lawyers are not necessarily immune from the lure of
prestige or income, albeit income of the psychic, rather than pecuniary, variety. Public interest and
legal services lawyers may, like other attorneys, view the "big case" as a vehicle for achieving greater
recognition both within and without the legal profession. Seeking such recognition, even as a by-
product of securing and protecting the legal rights of clients, may close one's eyes to the societal
consequences of legal action. See A. GOULDNER, THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUALS AND THE RISE
OF THE NEW CLASS 18-20 & n.31 (1981). But see Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New
Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L. REV. 487 (1980) [hereinafter New Legal Formalism] (describing view
that clinical legal educators, often recruited from legal services settings where individual, not sys-
temic advocacy is the norm, are needlessly modest in their aspirations for achieving a better society
through law). See generally Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92
YALE L.J. 1198, 1240-47 (1983) [hereinafterLegality and Welfare] (positing existence of professional
class that celebrates virtues of exercise of discretion by members of class, such as judges and lawyers
seeking to reform social institutions, but that defeats itself by denying discretion to and causing
alienation among more "proletarian" groups, such as social workers or therapy aides, who work
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sistent with the public interest. The client, for her part, may have similar re-
wards in mind. Short-term realization of these goals may aid the client, but may
harm those similarly situated and injure society as a whole. Because neither
lawyers nor clients typically experience these injuries immediately, directly, or in
a concentrated form, negative effects on nonclients are usually external to the
calculations of lawyers and clients.20 Nonclient and societal interests have little
voice in the traditional lawyer-client relationship, save for the whimper, when
appropriate, of reference to the client's enlightened self-interest. 2 1 Because
traditional lawyers and clients have little incentive to consider adverse social
effects, it should not be surprising that these effects often proliferate as a result of
legal action.
Flaws in human inference and judgment reinforce the lack of regard for the
public interest in traditional lawyer-client relationships. Lawyers and clients,
like other people, tend to believe that one phenomenon causes another when the
phenomena share a cosmetic similarity.22 These cosmetic links are often charac-
teristics with emotional or graphic resonance. 23 Causal connections not high-
more closely with disadvantaged clients). The literature critical of public interest lawyers from the
right is less elegant in its analysis than Simon's left critique. See, ag., The 1984 Federalist Society
National Meeting, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 225 (1985) (debunking public interest lawyers as
officious intermeddlers). However, the mean tone of right attacks should not prevent a discerning
public interest lawyer from appreciating the kernel of truth hidden in the mess of ideological pottage.
Public interest lawyers, like all other persons, have a web of motivations, perceptions, and scenarios
that comprise a basis for their action in the world. Unhurried deliberation about the ultimate conse-
quences of legal action may not be the first priority for all lawyers seeking such action.
20. See Calabresi & Malamed, supra note 17, at 1115-24 (discussing pollution and resulting
health and aesthetic harms as externalities in the relationship of operators of polluting plant and
plant's customers).
21. See Nelson, supra note 13, at 533 (noting that only 2.4% of respondents in a study of large
law firms acknowledged giving advice to clients about "public relations concerns" raised by possible
legal action). But cf. I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 13-14, 33 (1959)
(discussing prudence as capacity to perform actions that benefit others but also ultimately benefit
oneself); Fuller & Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J.
1159, 1161 (1958) (urging lawyers to discuss with clients the "long-run costs" of legally permissible
actions that conflict with the spirit or purpose of legal provisions); Gordon, supra note 2, at 28-29
(lawyers often couch negative advice involving moralistic or political judgments in prudential terms,
rendering it more amicable to clients). Lawyers' advice about clients' enlightened self-interest can be
exceptionally helpful in furthering moral or policy values that this Article articulates, even though
such prudential advice ultimately rests on an appeal to the client's self-interest, and is therefore less
radically different from traditional advice given by lawyers than is the nonclient-oriented advice
outlined in this Article. For example, take the issue of evictions. Suppose, before the dawn of rent
control in New York City, that lawyers had advised their landlord clients vigorously that wholesale
evictions and exorbitant rent increases would anger the public, and set the stage for rent regulation.
This advice, which in retrospect appears accurate, would have aided landlords interested in preserv-
ing their ability to set rents without government involvement. It also would have served moral and
policy goals by tempering harsh results for indigent tenants and diminishing the need for govern-
ment action to assist tenants pinched by high housing costs. Even if this Article's nonprudential
approach simply sparks more such prudential advice to clients, the Article will have moved lawyer-
client deliberation in the right direction.
22. See R. NISBETr & L. Ross, supra note 10, at 115-22; infra notes 78-79 and accompanying
text.
23. The 1988 Presidential election provides a good example of the effect of this tendency to
attach disproportionate weight to salient characteristics. Vice-President Bush and his supporters
apparently had extraordinary success with commercials that linked Governor Michael Dukakis' fur-
lough program to a rape and attempted murder perpetrated by one furloughed inmate, Willie Hor-
ton. The brutal crimes committed by Horton engrained themselves in the public imagination, which
also seemed to latch on to the fact, brought home by a photograph in one of the ads, that Horton was
1990]
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lighted by such salient attributes tend to get lost in the shuffle, whether the
attorney's motivation is altruistic24 or avaricious. 25 From the perspective of pol-
icy, these less salient connections can be the most important.
Rules can cope with each of these defects. Formulating sound rules pro-
motes predictability and ease of application. 26 Designing rules that highlight less
salient causal connections can compensate for flaws in human inference. Rules
also can oblige lawyers and clients to pay heed to harms to the public interest
that otherwise would be ignored in the rush toward short-term gains. The
knowledge that all parties are subject to such rules would enhance trust among
adversaries and highlight the virtues of cooperation. Lawyers could witness the
realization of rhetoric touting law as a noble profession.
This Article's own rhetoric about rules also requires realization. The next
section sets out suggested rules for deliberation about nonlegal issues and the
interests of nonclients.
black. The saliency of the image of Horton, his crimes, and his white victims eclipsed all reasonable
talk about Dukakis' and other furlough programs around the country.
24. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text (discussing case of institutional reform litiga-
tion in area of mental health). Rights, particularly rights to avoid tangible harms such as poor
institutional conditions or abusive repossession practices, are often salient because they carry an
intense emotional resonance. Other rights, such as those guaranteed by the first amendment, may
not have such resonance to everyone, particularly when the exercise of those rights is seen through
the faulty human inferential prism as privileging concrete injuries. This may be one reason why
juries tend to be so willing to find liability and damages in libel cases, and why constitutional rules
governing the standard of liability for libel are necessary. Lack of salience probably also explains the
popular view that the rights of criminal defendants embodied in the exclusionary rule are an irreme-
diable obstacle to effective law enforcement. Cf Kannar, Liberals and Crime, TnE NEw REI'UBLIC,
Dec. 19, 1988, at 19 (discussing practicalities of law enforcement under regime of exclusionary rule).
The exclusionary rule's deterrent effect on police misconduct is too general to visualize. By contrast,
people have no trouble in visualizing a criminal committing a crime, and then escaping punishment
due to the application of rules of constitutional criminal procedure. Cf. R. NlsBE'rr & L, Ross,
supra note 10, at 57-58 (subjects in psychology experiment were unduly impressed with single case
study of irresponsible and pathologically dependent welfare mother, but were unimpressed by statis-
tical data demonstrating that many families remain on welfare for only a relatively short period of
time).
25. See infra note 98 (discussing impact of flaws in inference on tortfeasors' perceptions of
policy).
26. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187-88 (1978) (the snail darter case) (rejecting "fine utilita-
rian calculations" regarding relative costs of imperiling species of perch and halting construction of
dam in favor of clear rule making species preservation paramount); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 413-23 (1975) (discussing importance of rule embodying presumption that back pay is
appropriate remedy for employment discrimination); see also Kannar, supra note 24, at 19, 20-23
(discussing virtues of Miranda and exclusionary rules in criminal procedure); Margulies, After
Marek The Deluge: Harmonizing the Interaction Under Rule 68 of Statutes That Do and Do Not
Classify Attorney's Fees as "Costs", 73 IowA L. REv. 413, 427-31, 441-45.(1988) (discussing impor-
tance of rules governing relationship between attorney's fee awards and settlement offers). The pre-
dictability promoted by rules, however, may sometimes be an illusion. See Simon, Legality and
Welfare, supra note 19, at 1224 (discussing "law of conservation of discretion" under which system
of rules designed to curb discretion merely moves discretion to another part of the decisionmaking
process). The trend toward certainty in criminal sentencing, exemplified by the work of the United
States Sentencing Commission, may be an example of the difficulty of eliminating discretion. The
absence of discretion in sentencing may simply push discretion forward in time in the criminal jus-
tice process, to the stage of drafting an arrest warrant or initially charging a defendant. See, e.g.,
Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEo. L.J. 1015, 1044 & n.115 (1981).
Discretion at these stages of the process is even less reviewable, and therefore potentially more arbi-
trary and unpredictable, than discretion in sentencing.
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II. A MODEL FOR COUNSELING ABOUT NONLEGAL ISSUES AND THE
INTERESTS OF NONCLIENTS
The following chart sets out the areas in which broader lawyer-client coun-




a. The action or decision will harm others.
b. The action or decision involves lying or misleading.
c. The action or decision violates the norm of equality of all persons.
d. The action or decision is one that the client would not wish for every-
one in society.
2. Psychology:
a. The action or decision may engender guilt or regret.
b. The client should seek the services of a mental health professional.
3. Policy:
a. Unintended consequences
i. Chilling effect: The action or decision may diminish the availabil-
ity of goods, services, or information, or may create incentives to
impinge on socially important or fundamental interests or
relationships.
ii. Public burden: The action or decision will harm others in a way
that ultimately will require a remedy from society at large.
b. The action or decision will result in a net cost to society if all individu-
als behave in a like manner. See 1.d. (individuals should act as they
would have others act).
The lawyer should have a duty to advise the client to modify her position when
these factors apply and should have the right to withdraw if the client disregards
that advice,28 so long as withdrawal will not immediately and irrevocably preju-
27. Cf. Leubsdorf, Three Models of Professional Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1021 (1982)
(discussing alternative visions for conceptualizing and implementing professional change). But see
Rhode, supra note 14, at 641-42 (counseling against exclusive role for bar in professional reform);
Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 689,
719 (1981) (noting that implementing professional reform through professional self-regulation is
only one alternative; other alternatives include more direct judicial or executive supervision without
reliance on the bar).
28. This option to withdraw should not be available in criminal cases, or other matters, such as
commitment proceedings, involving a liberty interest. In these areas, withdrawal might conflict with
an individual's right to an attorney under the sixth amendment, or might otherwise compromise
protections against arbitrary confinement.
Mention of the distinctive values embodied by liberty interests points up the parallels between
this Article's approach and the duties currently imposed on prosecutors. A prosecutor has a duty to
see to it that "justice shall be done," even at the cost of losing a case. See Young v. United States ex
rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 802-03 (1987) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78,
88 (1935)); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1982) (noting that
prosecutor has different responsibility from that of most other advocates); cf. Green, Her Brother's
Keeper: The Prosecutor's Responsibility When Defense Counsel Has a Potential Conflict of Interest,
AM. J. CRIM. L. 323 (1989) (discussing prosecutor's obligation to disclose and, in certain situations,
attempt to remedy defense counsel's conflict of interest). Prosecutors also have a heightened obliga-
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dice the client's interests.2 9 In many cases, the lawyer's counseling alone, with-
out the threat of withdrawal, will persuade the client. Verbal interchange, even
interchange not backed by threats, can be significant for rational beings. 30 In
addition, the lawyer and client may have developed a relationship of trust,
3'
which the client does not wish to jeopardize. Moreover, seeking other counsel
out of impatience with the attorney's advice will consume time and effort, with-
out yielding a clear return, because a new lawyer will be under the same obliga-
tion to counsel the client. 32 In other situations, however, counseling alone will
not be effective. The lawyer, after making a diligent effort to counsel the client,
must decide for herself whether to threaten to withdraw, or actually to
withdraw.
33
The regime described above may raise questions even for those who ac-
knowledge that advising a client on nonlegal issues and the interests of non-
tion to disclose certain kinds of information to their adversaries, particularly information that tends
to exculpate the defendant, mitigate the severity of the alleged offense, or otherwise justify a reduc-
tion in punishment. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(B) (1982).
This Article's argument would support granting civil attorneys discretion to withdraw from repre-
sentation if their clients refused to permit them to disclose, in the interests of justice, information
damaging to their clients' case. It would not support mandating such disclosure in instances in
which current professional regulations and discovery rules do not create a duty to disclose.
29. This kind of prejudice could involve, for example, the pendency of a trial or a procedural
deadline, such as the need to answer a complaint, with a preclusive effect. See also Freedman, supra
note 5, at 333 (urging that lawyer should have the right to withdraw "if withdrawal can be accom-
plished without significant harm to the client's interests").
30. See The Consultative Process, supra note 10, at 414-23 (discussing value of consulting par-
ties affected by a given governmental decision, even when governmental agency is not obliged to
defer to views of those consulted); Private Ordering, supra note 10, at 680 (asserting that "verbal
behavior" of parties is not a mere mask for expression of bargaining power, but is an important
factor in its own right).
31. See Private Ordering, supra note 10, at 662-63 (discussing mediating role of party's affiliates
and allies) (citing P. GULLIVER, SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AFRICAN SOCIETY 235-36 (1963) (noting
importance of continuing relationships as force moderating intensity of disputes among Arusha of
northern Tanzania)).
32. Some lawyers may be tempted to ignore or discount this obligation. See G. HAZARD, Supra
note 6, at 146 (noting possibility of Gresham's law phenomenon in which lawyers willing to forgo
counseling clients about moral concerns will get the bulk of client business, driving out more consci-
entious practitioners). Enforcement, therefore, becomes a major issue. While it would be naive to
assume that enforcement will be easy, two methods may hold promise, albeit promise purchased at
the risk of inroads into attorney-client confidentiality. One approach would be to require lawyers to
fill out an affidavit disclosing the extent of their counseling efforts. The affidavit could be couched in
hypothetical terms, to avoid revealing client confidences. Another device might be to permit a lim-
ited deposition of the lawyer, or to permit limited questioning of the client, again in hypothetical
terms, regarding the extent of counseling. Neglect of the counseling function would trigger sanc-
tions against the attorney.
33. The legitimacy of granting the lawyer such an option is discussed infra note 45. This Arti-
cle makes withdrawal an option, not an obligation, because of concerns about preserving individual
autonomy, and because of the moral hazard problems that an obligation might create, See supra
note 9; infra note 36 (discussing moral hazard). Barring any attorney from helping a client with a
legally valid claim or defense would impinge on autonomy interests, because it would leave individu-
als without recourse save forpro se representation. If lawyers can choose for themselves whether to
withdraw, the client at least has the opportunity to secure legal counsel. Mandating withdrawal
would promote moral hazard in a way that the eviction example presented illustrates. See supra note
9. If tenants or attorneys for tenants knew that landlords' lawyers were obliged to withdraw from
the representation of landlords seeking eviction of tenants, tenants would have much less incentive to
pay their rent. Tenants without this form of insurance against nonpayment are more likely to seek to
meet their obligations under their lease, as long as the landlord meets her responsibilities.
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clients constitutes a prqfessional responsibility. The next section of the Article
undertakes to explain and justify this counseling regime.
III. JUSTIFYING AND EXPLAINING THE COUNSELING RULES
A. Morality
Morality speaks to norms that we accept, often intuitively, as guides to con-
duct in society. Prohibitions on hurting others gratuitously, lying or misleading,
or treating others as inferior to oneself or to other groups in society constitute
examples of such norms. So do the maxims to treat others as you would have
them treat you and to act only in a manner that one would deem appropriate for
all other persons.
The proposed ethical guidelines set out above embody these norms. The
table sets out a very rough, and almost surely not exhaustive, compilation of
moral triggers. The conditions in the table are triggers, not precepts, because
they should prompt dialogue between lawyer and client, not necessarily resolve
the issue of the ultimate appropriateness of a proposed action.
The first moral concern is whether the action of the client or lawyer would
hurt third parties. Needlessly causing hurt or pain is viewed prototypically as
immoral.34 Is this view correct? The criterion for testing the validity of each
basis for moral dialogue derives from Kant's formulation of the categorical im-
perative. 3 5 Under this formulation, which corresponds to the fourth moral basis
for counseling in our table, persons should act only according to those com-
mands that the actor would apply to all persons. This formulation ensures that
moral rules reflect persons' status as interdependent beings, not islands of will
and inclination.
The Kantian, or contractarian, formulation proves the validity of the first
basis for counseling, the preference against the infliction of pain on others. Few
people, apart from masochists, wish to suffer from the needless infliction of pain.
Most people would heartily embrace a rule stipulating that others should not
34. See, eg., B. GERT, THE MORAL RULES 86 (1973) (identifying first five moral rules, includ-
ing "Don't cause pain."). Pain can include physical discomfort, sorrow, and anxiety. Id. at 81, 84-
85. Cf C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 149, 165 & 174 (1982) (actions which hurt others are
only justified when they are necessary to discharge responsibility toward oneself or others).
35. See I. KANT, supra note 21, at 39-59; J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 132-33 (1971). Of
course, a Nietzschean would counter that a person with a sufficiently strong will could inflict pain,
but avoid the reciprocal infliction of pain by others. See F. NIETZSCHE, THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY
AND THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS (1956). Nietzsche would assert that individual will was the sole
referent for questions of appropriate attitude and behavior. Each individual knows her will, and can
act on it, if she is free from fear of the oppressive customs and shibboleths that timid people call
morality. Any notion of a higher law is nonsense. Under this formulation, even discussing morality
as more than a sociological artifact is a waste of time. This argument is hard to answer in moral
terms, because it does not speak the language of moral philosophy. See B. GERT, supra note 34, at 8-
10 (discussing conclusory character of assumptions undergirding Kantian morality perspective).
Moreover, students of strategic behavior would observe that persons are susceptible to the suspicion
that others plan to cheat. Cheaters can inflict pain with the knowledge that many people will not
reciprocate, because of the force of the moral rule. Persons who suspect others of planning to cheat
may inflict pain first, as a preemptive measure. These suspicions create the prisoner's dilemma. See
infra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
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inflict pain on them. The corollary of this rule is that people should refrain from
inflicting pain on others.
The classic example of the just debt defeated by the statute of limitations or
the statute of frauds illustrates the operation of this trigger mechanism. Suppose
that the debtor, now rich, can easily afford to repay the loan. The creditor, on
the other hand, now poor, desperately needs the loan repaid to avoid dependence
on public assistance. Under these circumstances, refusal to repay the loan
would inflict needless suffering on the creditor. The lawyer, according to the
view of professional responsibility advanced in this Article, is under an obliga-
tion to point out to the client that invocation of the statute of frauds or statute of
limitations to bar the creditor's claim would cause suffering, while paying the
claim, in light of the debtor's current prosperity, would not have a comparable
bite. If, after discussion of the issue, the client refused to waive her defenses, the
lawyer could withdraw from representation of the client.
Kant's formulation of the categorical imperative supports this result. Few
people would want another person to decline to pay an admittedly just debt to
them, if the debtor had the requisite resources and the creditor was in need.
36
People have little moral basis for refusing to act as they would have others act
toward them.
37
The other moral trigger mechanisms set out in the table work in much the
same manner. Lying, misleading, or failing to disclose is immoral because it
heightens the risk that a person will suffer harm needlessly or simply because
such harm is in the immediate self-interest of another.38 Certain exceptions ob-
tain, as when the lie plausibly benefits the target39 or when the lie is apparent.
Misleading in other cases, however, can cause great human suffering.40 In most
circumstances, people do not like to be lied to-therefore, they should not tell
lies.
The third prescription set out in the table is the norm of equality. Here,
too, the categorical imperative operates. People generally wish to be treated the
same as others. People generally do not want others to use them for those
36. The only argument for such a result would be that the debtor believed that he had a duty to
be aware of and comply with legal formalities such as the statute of frauds or limitations. See Ken-
nedy, supra note 10 (critically assessing importance of form as vehicle for teaching self-reliance);
Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STuD. 351 (1973) (same). There is some basis for reluctance
to help people who have the knowledge with which to help themselves comply with formalities, but
are too indolent to use this knowledge. If we help such individuals too readily, and the availability of
help is well publicized, we risk providing further incentives to indolence. See R. EPSTEIN, supra note
10, at 320 (problem of moral hazard); Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99
HARV. L. REV. 509, 537-41 (1986) (same).
37. See Matthew 7:12 (Golden Rule).
38. See B. GERT, supra note 34, at 103-04 (discussing status of "Don't Deceive" as moral rule).
39. See S. BOK, LYING 57-72 (1978); B. GERT, supra note 34, at 104 (discussing white lies).
40. See, eg., Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1098-99 (1988).
Professor Simon describes a "well-known scenario" used to illustrate the human suffering that may
result from misleading others. In this scenario, an indigent brings a personal injury action. The
negligence of both the indigent plaintiff and defendant had contributed to the accident. The insur-
ance company's lawyer deals with the plaintiff's lawyer without correcting the plaintiff's lawyer as
to his mistaken belief that a recent statute abolishing the contributory negligence defense would
apply retroactively to this case. Id.
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others' private designs. 41 In light of this preference, people should treat others
equally.
42
A variation on the statute of limitations hypothetical illustrates the dynam-
ics of counseling clients about the equality norm. Suppose an ex-employee of a
corporation has a valid race discrimination claim. Because the employee did not
timely file his claim with the relevant government agency, however, the claim is
now time-barred. The employer concedes to his attorney that the claim is
valid.43 Furthermore, the employer reveals that the employee, even though he
did not file the claim, communicated with the employer by telephone and in a
letter that he wished to make this claim. The equality norm ordinarily would
require the employer to refrain from the discrimination that gave rise to the
claim, and to redress any discrimination that had occurred. 44 Under the princi-
ples advanced in this Article, the lawyer would be obliged to discuss with the
employer why the norm of equality, under the circumstances, was not trumped
by operation of the statute of limitations, regardless of the statute's legal force
and effect, and why, therefore, the employer still owed the employee redress. 4 5
41. See I. KANT, supra note 21, at 47-49 (discussing need to treat others as ends in themselves,
rather than means).
42. See J. RAwLS, supra note 35, at 504-12; cf. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 141-42
(Library of Liberal Arts; M. Ostwald trans. 1962) (discussing importance of redress by describing
the relation of equity to justice); Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforce-
ment of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 677-81 (1987) (discussing importance of
redress).
43. I am grateful to Howard Lesnick for pointing out to me that the client in such a case might
not make such a disclosure to his attorney, and that the attorney might not wish to complicate her
own situation by seeking such an admission. Cf. G. HAZARD, supra note 6, at 130-31 (citing
TRAVER, ANATOMY OF A MURDER (1958)) (lawyer may shape information elicited from client by
telling client, prior to eliciting information, that certain facts would lead to liability).
44. See J. RAwLS, supra note 35, at 100-01 (egalitarian conception ofjustice states the principle
that undeserved inequalities, which presumably include those caused by discrimination on the basis
of race, require redress).
45. If the employer refused to offer some compensation to the victim of discrimination, the
lawyer, under this Article's approach, would have the right to withdraw. See supra notes 28-29 and
accompanying text (discussing circumstances under which attorney should be able to withdraw).
A regime that permits an attorney to withdraw from a case before a tribunal because a valid
legal position creates unpalatable moral consequences appears to conflict with the legitimacy of legal
institutions and undermine notions of legislative primacy in the making of law. Lawyers making
such judgments will be substituting their own perspective for the perspective of society, which has
not prohibited the act in question. How can the lawyer in effect legislate norms that the legislature
has failed to impose?
This argument is less persuasive than it sounds. A purposive interpretation of the statute of
limitations demonstrates the defects of the argument. Cf. Simon, supra note 40, at 1102-07 (compar-
ing purposive approach with formal approach). The statute of limitations is designed to accomplish
two purposes: 1) to permit repose after a reasonable period of time has passed, and 2) to guard
against the immersion of the judicial system in the adjudication of stale claims, with their difficulties
of proof and invitation to concocted testimony. See, eg., Grossman, Statutes of Limitations and the
Conflict of Laws: Modern Analysis, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 9-10; Twerski & Mayer, Toward a Prag-
matic Solution of Choice-of-Law Problems-At the Interface of Substance and Procedure, 74 Nw.
U.L. REv. 781, 797 n.44 (1979); Note, Limitation Borrowing in Federal Courts, 77 MICH. L. REV.
1127, 1128-29 (1979). Deference to the statute of limitations in the example described above vindi-
cates neither of these goals. First, the employer always has been aware of the employee's claim,
because the employee has communicated with him. Second, the stale claims rationale is inapplicable
because the client, and his attorney, know that the claim is a just one. While a court may have to
wrestle with problems of proof if the client declines to acknowledge the justness of the claim, the
client's lawyer has no such problem. The legislature cannot reach this kind of instance, because
reaching it would require attorney disclosure of the kind that might frustrate the goal of complete
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These prescriptions are not problem free. They skirt over impingements on
a client's autonomy 46 and offer no conclusive answers to difficult moral ques-
tions that involve a clash of norms.4 7 In addition, implementing these prescrip-
tions may overemphasize the need for lawyers to discern individual clients'
states of mind, thereby setting the scene for invidious judgments based not on
morality, but instead on ethnic or socioeconomic stereotypes or other dubious
criteria.
48
communication between attorney and client, or would require client disclosure that would be impos-
sible to verify, since it would involve difficult inquiries into the client's state of mind, or would
involve drafting legislative categories of such precision that the costs of such legislation would ex-
ceed any possible benefits. The costs facing the attorney, in contrast, are much lower. But see infra
note 48 (discussing state of mind problems).
46. See infra note 115 (discussing compromises in client autonomy wrought by the model put
forward in Article).
47. One illustration of a clash of norms might be the frequently discussed hypothetical of the
mother who wishes to disinherit her son because the son refused to fight in Vietnam. See, e.g., Cox,
The Conditions of Independence for the Legal Profession, in ABA TORT AND INSURANCE PRACTICE
SECTION, THE LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE: PRESENT THREATS, FUTURE CHAL-
LENGES 53, 59-60 (1984) [hereinafter THE LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE]; Wasser-
strom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HuM. RTs. 1, 7, 10 (1975). On the one hand,
one could argue that the war in Vietnam was an immoral war, and that, therefore, the son was
correct in refusing to fight. Arguably, then, the mother was morally incorrect in penalizing the son
for his moral stance. As Schneyer notes, however, one also might believe that morality dictated that
the mother have a certain amount of discretion in deciding how to dispose of her property. See
Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 1529,
1563. Under this view, considerations of individual autonomy might permit the mother to accom-
plish her design consistent with moral precepts. If one was less inclined to view autonomy as a
separate justification for decisions, however, the mother's action might be considered immoral. A
different hypothetical, say, one positing a testator who wished to leave all of her money to the Amer-
ican Nazi Party, might raise this issue in even bolder relief. One might also believe that the son's
conduct amounted to a betrayal of his country and that it therefore was immoral. Developing a
consensus on such a situation may be difficult, or impossible. This state of affairs does not demon-
strate the futility of counseling on moral issues and situations; it may, however, demonstrate that
there are no "right answers" for this case. That is not to say, however, that there are no right
questions. Counseling can help focus on those points of inquiry.
48. Under this Article's model, for example, bias still can play a role in assessing the impact
and relevance to the model's prescriptions of particlar client decisions. If, for instance, the question
is the honesty of the client's position, bias can influence the lawyer's perception of the honesty of the
client. Racial, ethnic, or socioeconomic stereotypes can result in an invidiously lowered estimate of
the client's honesty.
Similar concerns apply whenever a judgment about morality depends on an assessment of a
client's state of mind. Questions about state of mind are often central to issues of morality. See, e.g.,
ARISTOTLE, supra note 42, at 169 (those who do their duty because of ulterior motives, not for
duty's own sake, are not just); 1. KANT, supra note 21, at 9-33 (completely moral actions comprise
only those taken because of the good will of the actor, defined as the actor's complete lack of self-
interest). State of mind questions also are often central to issues of law. One example of this is the
variation in the treatment of homicide in the criminal law, depending on the state of mind (mens rea)
of the actor. See, eg., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Margulies, supra
note 17; Perlin, The Supreme Court, the Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant, and Symbolic Val-
ues: Random Decisions, Hidden Rationales, or "Doctrinal Abyss?", 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1987); see
also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (requiring of intent for violations of the equal protec-
tion clause).
Such questions are notoriously difficult because by definition they deal with subjective evidence,
The law tends to resolve these issues by allowing their consideration by the maximum possible
number of factfinders. For example, a defendant typically can secure a jury to decide on her state of
mind. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (reducing role of intent in damages suits
against government officials in their personal capacity, to permit more expeditious dismissal of mer-
itless suits). Presumably, the presence of multiple factfinders will help correct for the biases and
mistaken inferences bound to develop in such amorphous inquiries. See, e.g., Kornhauser & Sager,
Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82 (1986) (arguing that increasing number of adjudicators will
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Because of the perils of an approach keyed to subjective factors such as the
client's state of mind, the attorney should focus on more objective factors, such
as whether someone would be hurt by the client's decision, or whether someone
would be treated as unequal. Framing issues in this manner downplays the role
of state of mind.
49
B. Psychology
The segue from discussion of state of mind to consideration of the lawyer's
obligation to counsel the client about the client's present and future psychologi-
cal well-being seems natural. Consideration of this issue has a different focus
than discussion of the lawyer's obligation to counsel the client about morality.
Each involves nonlegal interests. Counseling about psychology, however, unlike
counseling on morality, centers on the client, not on the impact of client actions
on nonclients.
The model advanced in this Article yields two rules regarding client psy-
chology. First, the lawyer must discuss with the client the possibility that the
acts or decisions of the client will yield feelings of guilt, remorse, or regret. Sec-
ond, the lawyer should urge .the client to seek professional mental health coun-
seling services if the client seems to need such services.
Both of these rules, particularly the first, already may be observed infor-
mally by many attorneys. Consider, for instance, the hypothetical of the mother
who wishes to disinherit her son because of the son's refusal to fight in Vietnam.
Archibald Cox has argued that many lawyers will not perfunctorily draft the
papers necessary to disinherit the son.5 0 Instead, Cox argues, many lawyers will
engage the mother in a discussion of how this decision, if the mother could look
back on it after it became irrevocable-after her death-would prompt feelings
generally increase accuracy and consistency of decisions); cf. R. NISBErr & L. Ross, supra note 10,
at 266-67 (increasing number of persons making judgments together typically will reduce impact of
biases and inappropriate inferential schemas). But see D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE (1979) (argu-
ing that shifting coalitions within decisionmaking group create inconsistencies in results); Easter-
brook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARv. L. REV. 802 (1982) (same); Farber & Frickey, The
Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REV. 873 (1987) (same). See generally Bryant, Models of
Joint Work (unpublished manuscript on file with the author) (discussing characteristics of collabora-
tive enterprise). The solitary lawyer, sitting in her office, is arguably a poor substitute for this safety
in numbers. Moreover, a lawyer lacks training in psychology or other disciplines that could help in
conducting an inquiry into an individual's state of mind.
Arguably, newer disciplines, such as kinesics or proxemics-the study of body language--can
permit us a wider view into the state of mind of an individual. But the interpretation of body lan-
guage can be invidious when it is conducted by an untrained person. See, e.g., Garcia v. Heckler,
589 F. Supp. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("sit and squirm" test rejected; apparent lack of acute physical
discomfort of benefits claimant appearing before administrative law judge is not significant factor in
assessing merits of claim). But see Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, in THE GOOD LAW-
YER, supra note 14, at 150 (assuming that lawyer is in fact well situated, by virtue of intimate rela-
tionship with client, to make assessments about a client's state of mind); Wolfram, A Lawyer's Duty
to Represent Clients, Repugnant and Otherwise, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 14, at 214, 232-
33 (same).
49. The question of honesty is more difficult to separate from the issue of state of mind and
intention. By including in this category actions that have the effect of misleading others, however,
regardless of why these actions were taken, the emphasis moves away from the intent of the mislead-
ing party.
50. See Cox, supra note 47, at 60.
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of regret over her harsh treatment of her offspring.5 '
Advice about the likelihood of regret ultimately may paint a more complete
picture of client wants than what a strictly legal analysis could produce.
5 2
While the mother initially may react with hostility to the lawyer's counsel, she
subsequently may decide that a less drastic alternative to disinheritance, such as
talking to the son, will ventilate and clarify her feelings sufficiently.
This approach may be more effective and less difficult for the lawyer than
counseling the client about morality. Furthermore, it does not involve as clear a
judgment on the lawyer's part regarding the appropriateness of the client's be-
havior. The lawyer can present guilt, remorse, and regret as positive phenomena
experienced in the world. 53 The more neutral54 character of such counseling
may create less client resistance and resentment than a judgmental stance of the
lawyer toward the client's morality. 55
Neutral advice also has a down side, however: it lets the lawyer off the
hook. Instead of grappling with knotty moral issues, the lawyer can seek refuge
in the comfortable pablum of pop psychology.56 Discernment about moral obli-
gations can give way to generalizations that condone irresponsible behavior. If
the problem with immoral behavior is not that it is immoral, but that it causes
guilt, the solution may be to stop feeling guilty, not to stop acting immorally. 7
Because there is some merit to this criticism, the psychological approach can
never supplant moral counseling.
The second rule on psychological issues, which requires counseling the cli-
ent about the need to seek professional mental health services, involves assuming
the judgmental stance that counseling about the presence of guilt can avoid.
Instead of telling the client that the client is like everyone else in her capacity to
experience guilt, the lawyer tells the client here58 that she is different. This ad-
vice can provoke denial and resentment.
The principal justification for giving advice about the client's need for
mental health services is that such advice ultimately may lead to greater happi-
51. See id.
52. See Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement (unpublished pa-
per delivered at the Second UCLA-Warrick International Clinical Conference, Sept. 1989).
53. See, eg., S. FREUD, THE EaO AND THE ID 24-25 (J. Strachey rev. ed. 1962) (discussing
guilt as a by-product of the development of human sexuality); B. GERT, supra note 34, at 205-07
(discussing the operation and nature of the "conscience"); J. RAWLS, supra note 35, at 474-76 (dis-
cussing the relationship ofguilt to a person's sense ofjustice). Literature also has provided memora-
ble examples of the power of guilt. See, e.g., F. DOSTOEVSKI, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (1958)
(guilt of a murderer over his crime led to hysteria, apprehension by the authorities, and ultimately to
insight and inner peace); E.A. POE, THE TELL-TALE HEART (1843) (murderer reifies his guilt, mak-
ing it into a thing that ultimately leads to his discovery).
54. Cf. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 6, at 211-17 (discussing nonjudgmental means of
conveying to client the need for client to see a mental health professional).
55. See id.
56. See New Legal Formalism, supra note 19 (criticizing the glibness and trivialization lurking
in a psychological approach). While such an approach need not be so pat, the risk exists.
57. Id. at 506-20.
58. Examples of cases in which such counseling might be necessary include commitment and
divorce proceedings. In each case, the client may benefit from the clarification about goals, objec-
tives, and points of view that psychological counseling can provide.
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ness and less risk of harm for the client and others. In extreme cases, a client
may starve herself or do other damage because of the presence of psychopathol-
ogy. Absent psychopathology, however, the client might make different choices
about her behavior.5 9 This assumption justifies the paternalism inherent in ad-
vice to seek mental health treatment. 60 Moreover, if the client, without treat-
ment, might harm others, then seeking to abate this risk with advice to obtain
treatment does not constitute paternalism. Concern for others is an independent
justification for advice, regardless of the best interests or considered values of the
client. In either event, giving advice to seek treatment is worth the resentment it
might provoke.
Another justification for the lawyer's providing counseling in this area is
that the lawyer may be the only person in a position to perform this function.
The client may not have a family. Alternatively, the family may be part of the
client's psychological problem, and thus may suffer from the same denial that
the client experiences. Furthermore, a psychologist, psychiatrist, or other
mental health professional may not be immediately available. Here, the lawyer's
responsibility is to advise the client to seek the services of a mental health profes-
sional, and, if necessary, to arrange the provision of such services upon the cli-
ent's consent.
61
A final justification for attorney advice about seeking mental health treat-
ment is that giving the advice, and receiving an expression of anger from the
client, creates a more comprehensive exchange between lawyer and client. 62
Sharing sentiment and information in anger can be a cathartic experience. This
kind of exchange may lead ultimately to a relationship of greater trust and
worth.
63
Despite its utility, however, important caveats attach to the lawyer's re-
sponsibility in this area. The lawyer must never interpret mere intransigence or
apparently unwise decisionmaking (such as a refusal by the client to accept a
settlement that the lawyer regards as being in the client's best interest) as trig-
gering her obligation to counsel the client on the value of mental health services.
Moreover, if the receipt of mental health services could have adverse legal conse-
quences to the client, for example, if it could lead to the client's involuntary
commitment to a psychiatric institution, then the lawyer must disclose these
59. See TORREY, NOWHERE TO Go 5-36 (1988) (recounting anecdotes of suffering of persons
with mental disabilities living in the community without treatment).
60. See D. LUBAN, supra note 7, at 346 n.12 ("overriding someone's unconsidered wishes in the
name of her own better-considered values is justifiable"); Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profes-
sion, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 454, 467-74 (same).
61. The client initially may scorn such attention. In this situation, the lawyer may wish to take
refuge again in a less threatening neutrality by connecting the receipt of mental health services to
progress in the client's case. See D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 6, at 211-23.
62. Cf. Dinerstein, supra note 52, at 6-9 (urging expanded dialogue); Pepper, supra note 5, at
630-31 (describing wide-ranging "moral dialogue" between lawyer and client); Simon, supra note 5,
at 52-60 (criticizing lawyers' practice of imputing narrow ends, such as maximization of wealth or
avoidance of confinement, to client).
63. Cf. ARISTOTLE, supra note 42, at 218-21 (knowledge of character of another, not mere
show of "signs of friendship," is necessary for friendship's development); infra note 127 and accom-
panying text (ventilating doubts and hidden interests is therapeutic for lawyer-client relationship).
1990]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
risks to the client when the lawyer first recommends recourse to professional
help.
Counseling about psychological elements inevitably affects nonclient inter-
ests and policy, even if its primary focus is on the client. A client who needs and
receives mental health services will create fewer burdens for her family, friends,
and neighbors. Moreover, timely receipt of treatment may obviate the need for
more costly and intrusive interventions at a later stage. The next subsection
examines policy issues in a broader canvas.
C. Policy
The following discussion of policy overlaps in part with the previous discus-
sion of morality. The division between the two categories is often artificial.
Many arguments that lend themselves to articulation in moral terms also find a
voice in the language of policy.64 Acknowledging this kinship, however, should
not obscure the substantial differences between these two perspectives.
One important distinction between policy and morality is that policy does
not concern the actor's state of mind. The crucial arena for policy is the effect of
a given decision in the real world.65 Creating means for coping with those ef-
fects, regardless of the level of intention of the relevant actor or actors, is the
goal of policy.66 Moreover, policy, because it does not focus on state of mind,
has a broader amplitude than morality. Policy can examine the indirect effects
of an action, as well as consequences that flow directly from the actor. Policy
also deals readily with aggregates of people and things. It is free from the narrow
focus on individuals that characterizes prototypical moral discussions.
Counseling must emphasize two strands of policy. The first strand deals
with the unintended consequences of litigation. The second concerns the imper-
ative, stated slightly differently in the section on morality, that persons behave as
they would have others behave. Both strands are vital in tying together client
decisions and nonclient interests.
1. Advice to the Client About The Unintended Consequences
of Legal Action
One of the more distressing attributes of legal action is that its conse-
64. See Laycock, The Ultimate Unity of Rights and Utilities, 64 TEX. L. REV. 407 (1985); see
also Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1203-13 (1967) (contrasting Humean and Lockean
perspectives on why takings of private property require compensation); cf. Lehman, The Pursuit of a
Client's Interest, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1078, 1084-91 (1979) (critizing utilitarianism as licensing de-
struction of individual rights in name of illusory certainty about computation of costs and benefits).
65. Cf. W. JAMES, PRAGMATISM 42 (1970) ("[t]he pragmatic method.., is to try to interpret
each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences"). The legal realists sought to anchor
the study of law in pragmatic concerns. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457,
460-62 (1897) (arguing that consideration of law should begin with effect of legal rules on conduct of
real world actors).
66. See generally O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881) (urging withering away of
mentalist models of law contingent on discovering the intent of the actor).
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quences tend to seem more certain and delimited than they turn out to be.67
This is particularly true when one considers consequences for the public at large,
in addition to consequences for the client or identifiable third parties. The diffi-
culty of determining in advance consequences for the public68 has led at least
one commentator to abjure such prognostications and concentrate on conse-
quences to identifiable individuals. 69 This choice to abstain is poignant, because
legal action that initially appears benign, or at least neutral, ultimately can in-
jure society.
Injury to the public weal from legal action has two major sources. One
source is the chilling effect that legal action can exert on social enterprises that
the legal action exposes to heightened restrictions or risks. The second source is
the burden on the public created when legal actions or decisions result in un-
compensated harms to persons who ultimately turn to society for assistance.
This subsection discusses these phenomena in turn.
a. Chilling Effect
The assertion of legal rights may restrict or inhibit socially worthwhile ac-
tivities and relationships. This chilling effect arises when two conditions are
present. First, the legal action must impose actual or potential costs on activi-
ties. Second, exit from these activities must be feasible.
The best known example of this phenomenon, and the source of its label
"chilling effect," is the operation of libel law. The standard for proving libel in
the United States is quite onerous, particularly if the plaintiff is a public figure.
70
The rationale for such a high standard is that a less onerous test would chill the
ardor of the media, as well as individuals, in discussing, debating, and conveying
information about the events of the day. If the costs of conveying such informa-
tion became too steep, the media simply would exit by not conveying informa-
tion that could trigger such costs. Newspapers and news broadcasts would
become one huge "Living Section." Public enlightenment about issues other
than movies, food, and home improvements would plummet.
The applicability of the chilling effect problem goes beyond libel law.71 One
67. Cf. ARISTOTLE, supra note 42, at 152-53 ("practical wisdom" is important because "mat-
ters of action admit of being caused by things other than they are"); D. LUBAN, supra note 7, at 350
(citing uncertainty about consequences as one factor that should temper lawyers' resort to their own
political views as guide to litigation program); THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN
WAR *1.138 (future contains "hidden possibilities for good or evil"), cited in Neumann, On Teaching
the Process of Strategy 1, 1-2 (unpublished paper delivered at the Second UCLA-Warwick Interna-
tional Clinical Conference, Sept. 1989).
68. Determining anything in advance-that is, making a prediction-is notoriously difficult.
See, e.g., R. NIsBErr & L. Ross, supra note 10, at 139-66; Kahneman & Tversky, On the Psychology
of Prediction, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 10, at 48-68; see also Margulies,
supra note 17, at 823 n.183 (difficulty of predicting individuals' dangerous behavior).
69. See Morris, supra note 5, at 791-94.
70. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
71. Many tort claims or aggregations of claims work in a similar fashion. Medical malpractice
cases constitute a visible, albeit controversial, example. The prospect of large, unpredictable damage
awards has helped raise insurance costs to a point at which doctors assert that they cannot afford to
remain in practice. While the exact extent of the doctors' plight, and how much of it is self-inflicted
or derived from insurance company investment decisions, is debatable, it is hard to assert that mal-
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pertinent example focuses on the rights of the institutionalized mentally dis-
abled. These rights, typically based on the due process clause, include cleanli-
ness of surroundings, adequate staffing, avoidance of overcrowding, protection
against brutality, adequate medical care, elimination of inappropriate use of es-
pecially confining treatment techniques such as seclusion and physical restraints,
and other indicia of a decent, safe, and humane institutional environment for the
mentally ill.72 Few goals seem more self-evidently worthwhile. The path to this
goal, however, contains some pitfalls.
The pitfalls derive from pervasive failures of human inference, which afflict
the altruist and the apostle of mammon alike. People draw inferences and make
judgments according to certain heuristics and biases that serve them in good
stead in much of everyday life, but that can also lead them astray.73 For exam-
practice suits and awards help the situation, or encourage doctors to continue their work. The
imposition of new costs on medical practice segues into a search for exits. Because no law commands
that physicians stay in the practice of medicine, some doctors apparently are leaving practice, or at
least relocating to jurisdictions that doctors perceive as more friendly. This phenomenon raises the
cost and reduces the availability of medical care for everyone. Cf. Law, A Consumer Perspective on
Medical Malpractice, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 305, 308 (1986) (arguing that costs of medical
malpractice liability are not unreasonable if prospect of liability enhances quality of medical care).
But see Benedict & Saks, The Regulation of Professional Behavior Electroconvulsive Therapy in Mas-
sachusetts, J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 247 (1987) (presenting results of study which indicated that fear of
malpractice liability had little impact on procedures employed by psychiatrists who prescribed and
administered electroconvulsive therapy).
Other examples without the controversy built into the malpractice crisis are plentiful. See
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Serv., 812 F.2d 298, 304 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.)
(declining to hold state liable for failing to intervene to halt child abuse by removing child from
home; court asserted that liability would force state to choose between liability to the child for failing
to remove her, and liability to the parents for erroneously removing her), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 998
(1989); Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal.
Rptr. 97 (1988) (rejecting liability for pastoral counseling, on ground, inter alia, that liability would
hinder clergy in giving advice), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644 (1989); see also Michelman, supra note
64, at 1208-13 (discussing utilitarian account of virtues of property rights which posits that people
exposed to arbitrary and unpredictable governmental taking of private property will be discouraged
from engaging in productive work); White, The Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: The Poor Pay
Even More, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 503 (arguing that imposition of procedural safeguards on reposses-
sion of consumer goods purchased on installment credit makes credit more difficult to obtain); cf.
Baumol, Medicare Folly: Capping Doctors' Fees, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1988, § A, at 21, col. 2 (argu-
ing that cap on doctors' fees would discourage treatment of Medicare patients). See generally A.
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970) (analyzing different responses to entities' decline).
The concept of chilling effect is not new. It comprises at least part of the rationale for certain
evidentiary rules, such as the attorney-client privilege and the bar on admitting evidence of subse-
quent repairs. Each legal era seems to find new uses for the notion, without ever rationalizing its
overall impact on legal decisionmaking.
72. For decisions upholding a right to treatment or rehabilitation for the institutionalized men-
tally disabled, see Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); New York State Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), consent judgment approved sub nom.
New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975),
aff'd, 596 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 836 (1979); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781
(M.D. & N.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 335 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. & N.D. Ala.), orders entered, 344 F.
Supp. 373 and 344 F. Supp. 387 (N.D. & M.D. Ala. 1972), rev'd in part sub nom Wyatt v. Aderholt,
503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). See generally 2 M. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL (1989) (comprehensive account of genesis, implementation, and evolution of right to
treatment).
73. See R. NIsBETr & L. Ross, supra note 10, at 3-42; Tversky & Kohneman, Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 10, at 5; Ed-
wards & Von Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and Their Implications for the Law, 59 S. CAL. L. REV.
225 (1986); Moore, Trial by Schemas: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. -
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ple, people draw inferences about causation on the basis of the representative-
ness of particular events and conditions, that is, the extent to which these events
or conditions resemble each other. Points of resemblance between persons, con-
ditions, and events are likely to be salient characteristics, which are graphic, easy
to visualize, and have emotional resonance.
74
Salient and representative characteristics coalesce to form stereotypes and
causal scenarios. For example, people often perceive those with mental disabili-
ties as dangerous.75 Images from history and culture vividly depict persons with
mental disabilities as "wild beasts" contorted by unseen demons. 76 These salient
images stay in our memory. The representativeness heuristic plays a role be-
cause it makes intuitive sense to match these images of disorder with acts of
disorder and violence. Yet, intuition to the contrary, persons with mental diabili-
ties on the whole are no more dangerous than the general population.
77
These scenarios inhibit our ability to consider a full spectrum of informa-
tion. Causal scenarios are very difficult to diffuse, even when contrary evidence
presents itself.78 In addition, the availability of scenarios of causation, and the
promiscuity with which we apply them, contrasts with our reluctance to con-
sider information diagnostically. We more readily view an event as a cause of
another event than as a symptom. 79 The result of these defects in judgment is
that people draw the wrong conclusions about causation in the first instance and
then perpetuate their errors.
Mental health litigation illustrates the operation of failures of inference.
Poor institutional conditions are a salient characteristic. It is easy to visualize
psychiatric patients or residents of facilities for developmentally disabled and
mentally retarded persons as suffering because of dirty surroundings; crowded
wards; and scarce, harried, indifferent, or brutal staff. These conditions inspire a
strong emotional reaction, as figures as diverse as Senator Robert F. Kennedy
and Geraldo Rivera discovered some time ago.
80
The representativeness heuristic dictates that if these conditions are bad for
(1989); Saks & Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial By Heuristics, 15 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 123 (1980-81).
74. See R. NISBETT & L. Ross, supra note 10, at 122-30; Saks & Kidd, supra note 73, at 137.
75. See Saks & Kidd, supra note 73, at 133.
76. See M. FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION 15, 66-78 (1973) (discussing historical
views of mental illness); Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism of Insanity Defense Mythology
CASE W. Ras. L. REV. - (1990) (same).
77. See Saks & Kidd, supra note 73, at 13; supra note 68 (mentioning difficulty of predicting
dangerousness).
78. See R. NISBErr & L. Ross, supra note 10, at 167-92; Jennings, Amabile & Ross, Informal
Covariation Assessment: Data-Based Versus Theory-Based Judgments, in JUDGMENT UNDER UN-
CERTAINTY, supra note 10, at 211, 227-228; cf. T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLU-
TIONS 62-65 (1970) (discussing attachment of scientific community to widely shared paradigms and
beliefs as function of human distaste for incongruity).
79. See Tversky & Kahneman, Causal Schemas in Judgments Under Uncertainty, in JUDG-
MENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 10, at 117, 118-28.
80. See Margulies, The Newest Equal Protection: City of Cleburne and a Common Law for
Statutes and Covenants Affecting Group Homes for the Mentally Disabled, 3 N.Y.L. SCH. HUM. RTS.
ANN. 359, 360 n.5 (1986) (citing D. ROTHMAN & S. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS 17, 23
(1984) (describing scenes at Willowbrook Developmental Center from perspective, inter alia, of Ger-
aldo Rivera and Senator Robert F. Kennedy)); see also A. SCHLESINGER, ROBERT KENNEDY AND
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the mentally disabled persons affected, they also must be bad for all mentally
disabled persons, and for society as a whole. The causal schema that develops
from this inference holds that eliminating such iippalling conditions will, in and
of itself, improve the lot of the public and of the mentally disabled. Having a
court decree the creation and maintenance of a more humane environment
seems like the logical solution to the problem.
The difficulty with this solution is that it fails to take into account new
problems caused by the chilling effect of mandated improvements in institutional
conditions-problems bypassed by the causal schema described above. The sali-
ence of poor conditions and the representativeness of improvements as an em-
blem of reform obscure the feasibility of exit for the agency that must implement
such improvements. In this situation, the state often may exit by simply admit-
ting fewer people into institutions.81 Admitting fewer people reduces over-
crowding, one of the conditions targeted in institutional reform litigation.
Reducing admissions, however, also deprives people of access to psychiatric care
and increases the mentally ill homeless population. 82 The rise in this population
helps neither the mentally ill nor society.
HIs TIMES 445 (1978) (quoting Kennedy's testimony about a state developmental center before a
House committee).
81. See TORREY, supra note 59, at 157. There is some evidence that certain advocates for the
rights of the institutionalized mentally disabled sought better institutional conditions at least in part
because these advocates believed that states would rather close institutions than foot the bill for
reforming them. For these advocates, closing institutions that they regarded as irremediably flawed
was distinctly in the public interest. See Rhoden, The Limits of Liberty: Deinstitutionalization,
Homelessness, and Libertarian Theory, 31 EMORY L.J. 375, 407-08 (1982).
One does not have to resort to paternalism to discern the holes in the argument of advocates
untroubled by reductions in inpatient admissions. Paternalism provides the basis for the view that
some nondangerous people, under certain circumstances, are better served in institutions than in the
community, even if these people want to forgo treatment. Cf. supra notes 59-60 and accompanying
text (discussing paternalist justification for lawyer advising client to seek mental health treatment).
Reductions in admissions, however, tend to fall disproportionately on voluntary patients who ac-
tively seek inpatient care. Involuntary patients often are admitted in any case, because they are
perceived as dangerous and indeed, are sometimes referred by the criminal justice system. If rising
costs force reductions in beds, while the flow of involuntary patients remains constant or increases,
voluntary patients are squeezed out.
A poignant element of this situation is that voluntary patients often have no voice in institu-
tional reform litigation. Because, in theory, voluntary patients can leave the hospital at will, they
often cannot assert a liberty interest under the due process clause in seeking reform of institutional
conditions. The result is that advocacy and adjudication proceeds with little consideration of their
interests. This Article's approach would ensure more equitable treatment for these hapless persons.
82. See TORREY, supra note 59, at 156-59. Other factors include the psychiatric community's
erstwhile overconfidence in the efficacy of psychotropic drugs that purport to treat the symptoms of
mental illness, the lack of follow-up on discharged patients, the costs imposed by collective bargain-
ing agreements with institutional staff, and the lack of adequate housing in the community. On this
last point, see Margulies, supra note 80, at 362-63.
Another kind of exit involves what one could call a "shell game" played by the state between
institutions. In this game, the state takes resources needed to satisfy mandates of improved condi-
tions at one facility from other facilities not under mandates. In New York City, this game appar-
ently has resulted in resources being diverted to Manhattan Psychiatric Center, a facility that,
pursuant to a consent decree must make extensive improvements, from Creedmoor and Kingsboro
Psychiatric Centers, located in Queens and Brooklyn, respectively, which are not under similar obli-
gations. See Monitoring Conditions at Kingsboro P.C., QUALITY OF CARE NEWSLETrER OF THE
NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON QUALITY OF CARE, February-March 1989 at 11 (New York
State had to declare formal State of Emergency at Kingsboro to effect improvements at the facility),
The author's experience as an advocate for institutionalized persons with mental disabilities, as well
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The lawyer's duty in such a context is to counsel the client regarding the
chilling effect of litigation establishing or implementing the client's right to im-
proved institutional conditions on the availability of inpatient care.8 3 A rule or
guideline is needed to trigger discussion of the chilling effect, because flaws in
human inference will cloak the effect in the ordinary interaction between lawyer
as consultation with other advocates from New York and other jurisdictions, supports this observa-
tion.
Residential services for developmentally disabled and mentally retarded persons also are dis-
torted by exit strategies. The trend in recent years, prompted at least in part by institutional reform
litigation, has been to close large institutions or developmental centers such as Willowbrook. Be-
cause of the shortage of beds in appropriate institutions, persons with mental retardation whose
families cannot care for them end up on general medical wards in public hospitals, see Daley, Dis-
abled Foster-Care Youths Kept in New York Hospitals, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1989, § A, at 1, col. 4,
or in substandard community facilities that replicate the squalor of discredited institutions, see
Daley, 20 Retarded Children Shunted To Squalid Foster-Care Home, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1989,
§ A, at 1, col. 1. Neither the state nor advocates for the disabled have thus far developed a more
comprehensive response. The challenge is a compelling one.
83. At this point, the reader may ask: "Who is the client, anyway, given the possibility that a
patient at a state psychiatric facility may not have the capacity to make competent decisions?"
There are a number of replies to this question. First, many jurisdictions now provide that mere
presence in a psychiatric hospital, even if that presence is the result of involuntary commitment, does
not give rise to a presumption of incompetence. See, eg., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.01 (Mc-
Kinney 1988). Mental illness is so compartmentalized that an individual for whom hospitalization is
essential may retain the ability to make choices in certain areas, such as litigation, even though she
cannot understand the need for inpatient psychiatric treatment. This writer's experience with psy-
chiatric patients confirmed, at least anecdotally, that patients with resoundingly poor judgment on
some subjects nevertheless could make common-sense decisions, for example, about whether to drop
a request for a commitment hearing in exchange for the treatment staff's promise to grant the pa-
tient privileges. Patients were also more than equal to the tasks of keeping track of appointments in
court and following the details of their case. Courts have held that, because of this compartmental-
ization phenomenon, the involuntarily committed retain the right to vote. See, e.g., Manhattan State
Citizens' Group v. Bass, 524 F. Supp. 1270, 1275 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). In some instances, an individ-
ual's cognitive capacities may be so impaired that she cannot communicate effectively with her attor-
ney. The rules of professional responsibility have addressed this problem. See MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14(b) (Proposed Final Draft 1981) (citing client's inability to com-
municate, as well as client's inability to "exercise judgment"); cf Perlin & Sadoff, Ethical Issues in
the Representation of Individuals in the Commitment Process, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161,
179-80 (Summer 1982) (discussing ambiguity in ModelRules' treatment of flaws in client's judgment
as basis for lawyer's second-guessing client); Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer
Decisionmaking and the Questionably Competent Client, 1987 UTAH L. REv. 515, 559-67, 577-583
(arguing that when communication with the client is still possible, lawyer should seek to persuade
client of conspicuously correct course of action, rather than seeking appointment of a guardian). In
such situations, a guardian or guardian ad litem is necessary. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 77.09
(McKinney 1988). The lawyer can counsel the guardian or guardian ad litem about the dangers of
the chilling effect. In addition, a lawsuit may include a next friend of the patient or patients, who
can undertake to advise the patient and make certain decisions on the client's behalf. The next
friend may be an organization of parents or relatives of patients.
There is also some truth to the observation that in many law reform cases, the "real" client,
defined as the person who originates the suit and makes decisions about the propriety of settlement
versus continuing litigation, is really the lawyer herself. See Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration
Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976); Chayes, The
Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1281 (1976); cf. Grosberg, Class
Actions and Client-Centered Decisionmaking, 40 SYR. L. REv. 709 (1989) (arguing that lawyers in
class actions have responsibility to seek to communicate with representative sample of class mem-
bers). This situation does not obviate the need for counseling on the chilling effect syndrome or on
other matters. Indeed, given the venerable adage that anyone who represents herself has a fool for a
client, counseling would seem to be even more vital in such a context. The lawyer should consider
the chilling effect syndrome when the lawyer is really driving the case, at least as much as in other
settings. In a multilawyer office, one attorney can be designated as the official counselor. This attor-
ney can counsel her colleagues on the chilling effect syndrome.
1990]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
and client. The promotion of homelessness and the proliferation of gaps in ade-
quate placements for mentally disabled persons are not representative conse-
quences of attempts to improve institutional care. Detecting the connection
between these consequences and institutional reform litigation therefore requires
that lawyer and client think diagnostically-backward from phenomena to
causes-rather than causally-forward from causes to effects. Patterns of
human inference discourage diagnostic thinking.84 In addition, the compelling
and emotionally charged scenario of rights creation will obscure disadvantages
to the rights implementation process, such as the chilling effects syndrome.8 5 A
rule or guideline will compensate for these defects.
8 6
The discussion of the chilling effect that a rule or guideline facilitates need
not extinguish hope of progress in improving institutional conditions. A variety
of options present themselves for consideration. These options involve the legal
process, alternative dispute resolution, and self-help for victims of injustice.
One option is to seek to close the exit that frustrates attempts at reform. In
the context of institutional conditions, this can be accomplished by barring hos-
84. See supra text accompanying note 79; cf. R. NisBETT & L. Ross, supra note 10, at 91-93
(people tend to overassess degree of correlation between conditions because they consider only in-
stances in which condition A in fact occurs in tandem with condition B, while ignoring cases in
which condition A is not associated with condition B). In the mental health setting, condition A is
an improvement in institutional conditions, while condition B is an improvement in the lives of the
mentally disabled. The lawyer sees inpatients every day whose lives are better because of institu-
tional improvements, i.e., cases in which condition A is associated with condition B. The lawyer,
however, does not see the people outside who are refused admission, those cases in which conditions
A and B do not go together. Of course, the attorney, like everyone else, sees homeless persons.
Making the connection between homelessness and the higher cost of institutional care yielded by
institutional improvements, however, requires viewing homelessness as a symptom. Such a perspec-
tive calls for precisely the kind of diagnostic thinking that intuition disfavors.
85. See Tversky & Kahneman, Causal Schemas in Judgments Under Uncertainty, in JUDG-
MENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 10, at 125-28 (discussing persistence of causal schemas
based on salient facts).
A psychological explanation of the public interest lawyer's single-mindedness distinct from the
cognitive model invoked here relies on analysis of the motivation of public interest advocates. See
Bell, supra note 83, at 493, 504-05, 511 (discussing conflict between idealistic motives of advocates of
desegregation and practical concerns of parents about insuring better education, with or without
formal racial balance, for their children); see also Breger, Accountability and the Adjudication of the
Public Interest, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 349 (1985) (arguing that public interest lawyers and
clients have divergent agendas and that lawyers may hold to their agenda out of interest in preserv-
ing ability to exercise power without accountability); Rhoden, supra note 81 (focusing on divergent
agendas in context of mental health litigation); cf supra note 19 (discussing extent to which need for
recognition may influence public interest lawyers' choices of cases and strategy). The analysis of
motives arguably is less manageable and reliable and more cumbersome as an explanatory tool than
the analysis of flaws in general human inference employed in this Article. Analysis of motivation
rests on examination of individual states of mind. Such analysis is prone to the influence of the
analyst's bias. See supra note 49. Moreover, an analysis focusing on motivation cannot explain stud-
ies which appear to demonstrate that flaws in inference yield perceptions counter to self-interest in
certain situations. See R. NjSBErT & L. Ross, supra note 10, at 232 (citing study indicating that in
some contexts people "hold themselves more responsible for failures than for successes"); Ross &
Anderson, Shortcomings in the Attribution Process: On the Origins and Maintenance of Erroneous
Social Assessments, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 10, at 129, 134 (same).
86. A lawyer, whatever her intellect and education, is no less vulnerable than the client to such
flaws in inference. Cf Kahneman & Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 10, at 48, 68 (describing failures of graduate students participat-
ing in experiment that tested capacity for inference); Saks & Kidd, supra note 73, at 131 (citing
literature on inferential errors committed by, inter alia, psychiatrists, engineers, and bankers).
[Vol. 68
ATTORNEY-CLIENT DELIBERATION
pitals from refusing admission to demonstrably needy applicants for treat-
ment.8 7 This step will oblige the state both to upgrade institutional conditions
and to serve the entire needy population.8 8 In addition, advocates for institu-
tional reform can continue to litigate over institutional conditions, but can settle
based on more oblique remedies. Instead of pressing for more inpatient staff or
fewer admissions-measures that encourage exit- advocates can seek enhanced
funding for on-site advocacy, a greater role for watchdog groups that monitor
facilities and engage in cooperative problem-solving with little cost,8 9 and more
87. In some situations, exits involving denial of care to those seeking care can be controlled and
minimized. This is true if the particular jurisdiction provides, as a matter of state law, that all people
have at least a right to minimally adequate subsistence and to minimally adequate treatment. Law-
suits in New York have encountered some success in establishing such a right under the New York
Constitution, as well as under statutes. See McCain v. Koch, 70 N.Y.2d 109, 511 N.E.2d 62, 517
N.Y.S.2d 918 (1987); Klostermann v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 463 N.E.2d 588, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247,
on remand, 126 Misc. 2d 247, 481 N.Y.S.2d 580 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984). The problem is that coordi-
nation has been limited between those seeking better institutional conditions in psychiatric hospitals
and those seeking to close these exits from the obligation to improve conditions. Gaps in time be-
tween litigation on the right to adequate institutional conditions and on the right to subsistence and
community services have left many needy people without care.
To some extent, the lack of communication may be attributable to differences of culture and
ideology between lawyers and advocates for better institutional conditions and for subsistence serv-
ices, respectively. Lawyers at the Coalition for the Homeless in New York City who seek subsistence
rights for the homeless involving receipt of services such as housing coupled with counseling, not
cash benefits, are often proud throwbacks to a social work orientation. Cf D. ROTHMAN & S.
ROTHMAN, supra note 80, at 51-52 (describing change in perspective after the civil rights movement
from viewing disadvantaged populations as objects of paternalism to viewing them as individuals
bearing rights); Koh Peters, Concrete Strategies for Managing Ethically-Based Conflicts Between
Children's Lawyers and Consulting Social Workers Who Serve the Same Client 10 CHILDREN'S
LEGAL RTs. J. 15 (1989) (contrasting traditional role of lawyer to advocate in accordance with client
wishes, with role of social worker to act in accordance with perceived "best interests" of client);
Legality and Welfare, supra note 19, at 1214-15 (describing social work world view as paternalistic in
its conditioning receipt of benefits on acceptance of services). By contrast, a civil liberties perspec-
tive often characterizes lawyers seeking improvements in institutional conditions or the closing of
institutions. The paternalistic motives and assumptions of some subsistence services lawyers have
often conflicted with the assumptions of lawyers seeking improvements in institutional conditions.
See Rhoden, supra note 81, at 407 (discussing some civil liberties advocates' resistance to suits seek-
ing services for mentally disabled persons). This conflict has sometimes made communication and
cooperation difficult.
88. Advocates fighting racial discrimination long have had to contend with exit problems, see
Bell, supra note 83, at 474-77, although these problems are different in the context of racial discrimi-
nation because exit is triggered not by increased costs, but instead by ignorance, fear, and hatred.
Courts have sometimes rejected attempts by integration advocates to close exits. See, eg., Milliken
v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (rejecting interdistrict remedies designed to counter white flight and
demographic changes in central cities by embracing entire metropolitan area). One controversial
solution to the problem of exit in this area yielding conflicting signals from the courts has been to cut
back on minority access to goods and services used jointly with the white population. Under the
"tipping point" theory, the presence of too many minorities will ultimately frustrate integration, by
causing white flight. Some entities have restricted minority access to certain schools or housing
developments in the hope of convincing whites to remain. Courts have had mixed reactions to such
programs. Cf COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL EDUCATION LAW PROJECT, PROMOTING INTEGRATION
IN THE NEW YORK CITY HIGH SCHOOLS (1987) (concluding that efforts to limit minority use of
certain educational programs do not significantly enhance integration, but do materially impair ac-
cess to quality education for minority students). Compare Parents' Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High
School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1979) (approving school's use of restrictions on black
enrollment on ground that restrictions were genuine attempt to preserve integration), remanded for
furtherfactfinding, 738 F.2d 574 (1984), with United States v. Starrett City, 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir.)
(striking down restrictions on percentage of black residents in apartment complex), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 376 (1988).
89. See Report Offers Praise and Criticism for State's Community Residence Programs for Men-
tally Il Persons, QUALITY OF CARE, NEWSLETTER OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON
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support for independent legal and social work agencies dealing with the needs of
mentally disabled persons in the community. Advocates also can engage in indi-
vidualized advocacy, including carefully selected damages actions. 90
Nonlegal alternatives-including the option of self-help-are also promis-
ing. Oppressed people can band together, perhaps with the assistance of advo-
cates, legal or otherwise, and establish support networks. 9 1 These networks can
educate and act without the inflexibility of legalistic models of rights and entitle-
ments.92 For example, self-help networks can organize boycotts of merchants
who engage in employment discrimination or abusive credit or repossession
practices. 93 In other cases, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as
mediation and arbitration,94 or even the homely writing of letters, filing of ad-
QUALITY OF CARE, Nov.-Dec. 1988, 1, 5 (finding that level of funding was not significant factor in
variations in quality of community programs); Ray, Community Residences: Reaching for Their
Potential, QUALITY OF CARE, NEWSLETrER OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION OF QUALITY
OF CARE, Nov.-Dec. 1988, at 12 (noting that cooperative problem-solving seemed to work to im-
prove programs, without the expenditure of additional funds).
90. See, e.g., A Misdiagnosed DeafMan's Ordeal, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1988, § I, at 81, col. 1
(describing victory in tort suit brought by deaf man misdiagnosed as being mentally retarded). Mis-
classification cases may not promote exit from provision of institutional care, even with significant
damages awards, because the state may avoid future exposure through means less drastic than exit.
In misclassification cases, less drastic means may include simply providing hearing exams for all
residents of developmental centers.
The attorney and her client or client representative in the institutional reform setting also may
decide, after deliberation, to seek the maximum possible improvements in an institution despite the
feasibility of exits for the institution's managers. Attorney and client may believe that consideration
of exits and other policy issues obscures the importance of justice and decent treatment for some of
society's most vulnerable persons. See generally Fletcher, Paradoxes in Legal Thought, 85 COLUM.
L. REv. 1263, 1292 (1985) (arguing that tort law wanders dangerously afield when it exalts policy
over principles of corrective justice rooted in fault and desert); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort
Theory, 85 HARv. L. REv. 537, 537-39, 547 n.40 (1972) (same). Institutional reform litigation,
despite its flaws, clearly created a better life for many clients. See, e.g., D. ROTHMAN & S. ROTH-
MAN, supra note 80, at 200-53 (describing mentally retarded persons' new opportunities for growth,
experience, and dignity in community living). Flaws in human inference that, at the time of com-
mencement of instititutional reform litigation, may obscure disadvantages of the process, should not
dull perception of its successes. Cf. Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics
and Biases in Hindsight, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 10, at 338-39 (discussing
salience of failures and flaws in programs compared with benefits that programs bring).
91. See, e.g., J. CHAMBERLIN, ON OUR OWN: PATIENT-CONTROLLED ALTERNATIVES TO
THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 86-106 (1978); Height, Self-Help--A Black Tradition, THE NA-
TION, July 24-31, 1989, at 136. Other examples of self-help groups and advocates include Mitch
Snyder and the Community for Creative Nonviolence (homeless group), and Joe Rodgers and the
National Mental Health Consumers Association (organization of the mentally ill). See Torrey, supra
note 59, at 214-15 (discussing self-help groups in mental area).
92. Cf. Alfieri, The Antimonies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16
N.Y.L. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 659 (1989) (arguing that reliance on legal system can sap will of
oppressed people, instead of acting as catalyst); Legality and Welfare, supra note 19, at 1200-67
(arguing that legalistic model fosters alienation and fails to meet human needs). Perhaps the
toughest endorsement of self-help comes from Malcolm X, who praised the person "who feels that
he'll get farther by standing on his own feet and doing something for himself towards solving his own
problem, instead of accusing you of creating the problem and then, at the same time, depending
upon you to do something to solve the problem." MALCOLM X, THE LAST SPEECHES 28 (1989).
93. Cf. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 749-50 (1976) (describing Alabama bus boycotts); J. WIL-
LIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE 61-63 (1987) (same). Demonstrations also can be effective. See Mari-
ott, Homeless in Park Sticking to a Cause, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1988, § B, at 3, col. I (describing
civil disobedience by group of homeless people protesting government policies).
94. See, eg., Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 668 (1986) (discussing pros and cons of trend toward alternative dispute resolution and devices
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ministrative complaints, and use of the telephone, can be effective in gaining
appropriate results for a client without the adverse effects produced by systemic
litigation.
95
The promise of these alternative approaches is enhanced when lawyers for
the opposing party, be it state, merchant, or tortfeasor, can counsel their client
through methods that emphasize the policy benefits of helping those with legiti-
mate grievances. 96 The next subsection discusses this aspect of counseling.
b. Public Burdens
It would be peculiar, as well as violative of moral notions of equality, if
lawyers directed counseling about policy solely toward those poor, disadvan-
taged, and vulnerable persons who typically seek law reform. Under the model
advanced in this Article, the rich and powerful receive counsel about moral is-
sues; counseling about the public burden created by practices of the rich and
powerful supplements counseling about morality.
Actions and decisions create a burden on the public in the following man-
ner. Suppose a pedestrian is injured through the negligent actions of a motorist.
Ordinarily, the victim of such negligence would have a cause of action against
the person who caused his injuries. Suppose, however, that the victim loses his
cause of action, for example, because his suit was not timely. The law will not
oblige the tortfeasor to compensate the victim. Yet, the victim still has expenses,
including medical bills, to pay. In addition, the nature and severity of the inju-
ries may require constant care for the victim. If the victim is indigent, or other-
wise lacks resources, the public, through government, becomes the provider of
last resort. Government and the taxpayers, as well as competing candidates for
governmental assistance who have a relatively smaller pie of resources to rely
upon because of the need to aid this particular victim, assume the burden other-
wise shouldered by the tortfeasor.
97
promoting settlement); Margulies, supra note 26, at 413 (suggesting alternative system for fee deter-
mination that will promote alternative dispute resolution).
95. Individual contacts by lawyers sometimes bring alarmingly quick responses from bureau-
crats. Despite this phenomenon, Professor Simon has criticized clinical legal educators for empha-
sizing relationships with individual clients rather than stressing political values and critique. See
New Legal Formalism, supra note 19, at 555-57. From the point of view of this Article, the emphasis
on individualized over systemic lawyering is in many ways a positive aspect of clinical legal
education.
96. See infra notes 101-06 and accompanying text (discussing how complementary advice of
counsel for prospective opposing parties can dispense with usual prisoners' dilemma game enacted
by litigation).
97. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 147-48; see also Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311
U.S. 7 (1940) (noting phenomenon in which workers discriminatorily discharged in violation of the
National Labor Relations Act subsequently were hired by government agencies for work relief pro-
gram; holding that National Labor Relations Board lacked authority to order employer in violation
of the Act to reimburse agencies for wages of discharged workers); Cihlar, Client Self-Determination:
Intervention or Interference?, 14 ST. Louis U.L.J. 604, 617-18 (1970) (public burden problem in case
of senior citizen who arguably endangered his health by sleeping under a barn, and case of motorcy-
cle driver who refused to wear a helmet); Margulies, supra note 3, at 554-55 (denying employment
rights and remedies to undocumented workers will not persuade such workers to leave the United
States, but will only create health and other problems that state, local, or federal government ulti-
mately will have to address).
1990]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The tortfeasor's lawyer should discuss with the client these negative policy
implications of avoiding responsibility.98 The discussion should be reinforced,
as usual, by the lawyer's ability to withdraw if she disapproves of the moral or
policy consequences of the client's decisions. This ability precipitates the negoti-
ation between lawyer and client alluded to earlier in the Article. 99 Ideally, the
client, after negotiation with his lawyer, and perhaps after the lawyer has dis-
cussed this matter with the victim's lawyer, agrees that paying some nontoken
amount in compensation is the solution for both moral and policy reasons. t°°
Remedial action eliminates or minimizes the public burden effect.
This advice and discussion is useful even if the victim has preserved his
cause of action. In that event, recognizing the public burden caused by an un-
compensated wrong can help resolve the prisoner's dilemma problem often
caused by litigation.
2. Dealing With the Public Choice Problems Created by
Opportunities for Litigation
Litigation typically involves more than one party, at least in an adversarial
system such as our own. Whenever more than one party participates in a pro-
cess, possibilities for gamesmanship and strategic behavior are plentiful.',
98. Discussion should be required because cognitive flaws affect tortfeasors' perception of the
public burden effect. A tortfeasor who avoids liability because of the statute of limitations can plug
this development into a readily available scenario. See supra notes 22-25 & 78-79 and accompanying
text (discussing cognitive psychologists' study of the formation of schemas and scenarios based on
characteristics with graphic or emotional content). That scenario depicts the situation in terms of
the tortfeasor's escape from oppression at the hands of an unforgiving plaintiff. Discerning the bur-
den assumed by the public as a result of the tortfeasor's default may entail the kind of diagnostic
thinking that cannot insinuate itself into this story. Therefore, without some guide for attorney-
client deliberation, the public burden effect may not be considered.
99. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text; see also Gifford, The Synthesis of Legal
Counseling and Negotiation Models: Preserving Client-Centered Advocacy in the Negotiation Context,
34 UCLA L REv. 811 (1987) (discussing interplay between lawyer and client that occurs contempo-
raneously with negotiation between adversaries).
100. Paying some amount recognizes the importance of ongoing relationships in an interdepen-
dent society. Cf McThenia & Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660 (1985) (describing
settlement and alternative dispute resolution as contemporary expressions of community between
persons based upon tradition of shared religious understandings). Reconciliation based on the need
to preserve relationships is a staple of dispute resolution in Africa and Asia. See R. BENEDIcT, THE
CHRYSANTHEMUM AND THE SWORD: PATTERNS OF JAPANESE CULTURE 140-44 (1967) (discuss-
ing web of obligations that cannot be evaded in Japanese society); Private Ordering, supra note 10, at
639-49 (describing role of continuing relationships in dispute resolution among Arusha in Tanzania
and in Indonesian culture). Some feminist theorists also have emphasized the importance of relation-
ships over abstract concepts of right and justice. Compare C. GILLIGAN, supra note 34, at 149
(1982) with C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 38-39 (1987) (asserting that women's atten-
tiveness to relationships may simply ratify existing inequities instituted by men at the expense of
women). See generally Women in Legal Education-Pedagogy, Law, Theory, and Practice, 38 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1988) (assembling articles on effect of womens' experiences on practice and study
of law).
101. See generally D. MUELLER, supra note 48, at 11-18 (describing differences in cooperative
behavior between large and small communities); Ackerman, Elliott & Millian, Toward a Theory of
Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 313,
321-29 (1985) (discussing prisoner's dilemma game as applied to passage of federal environmental
legislation); Easterbrook, supra note 48, at 806 (pressure to settle influences the attributes of cases
resolved before Supreme Court); Farber & Frickey, supra note 48 (regarding whether legislature can
effectively deliberate about public policy); Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 48 (focusing attention on
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Each party has an opportunity to trick or bluff the other into a vulnerable posi-
tion. If the parties eschewed tricks and games, however, and simply cooperated
with each other to realize mutual goals, in all likelihood they would achieve
greater total benefits. 102
Cooperation involves three steps on uncertain ground. First, as in our dis-
cussion of the categorical imperative regarding moral actions, parties must real-
ize that they cannot get what they want solely by strength of will. Second, and
even more difficult, they must acknowledge that the limits of will are also appar-
ent to their adversary. Third, they must appreciate that different sets of parties,
involved in different disputes or processes, may ignore the first two steps and
achieve short-run individual gains, but only at a long-run cost to society as a
whole.
Litigation embodies the forces set up against cooperation. Parties tend to
feel that they can get what they want, at the expense of the other party to a
dispute, by bluffing x0 3 or by taking the dispute to final adjudication by a third-
party decisionmaker.1° 4 This state of mind tends to maximize costs to the par-
ties, in aggregate, and to society.10 5 In addition, even if particular parties are
interested in cooperation, the cultural pervasiveness of litigation as a form of
dispute resolution10 6 forces parties to consider individual advantage and down-
multijudge courts and relation to adjudication theory); Kronman, Contract Law and the State of
Nature, I J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 5 (1985) (describing problem of mutual distrust as barrier to
reaching agreement).
102. See R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENTS WITHOUT
GIVING IN (1981); Hyman, Trial Advocacy and Methods of Negotiation: Can Good Trial Advocates
Be Wise Negotiators?, 34 UCLA L. REV. 863 (1987).
103. See, eg., Margulies, supra note 26, at 426 n.83 (defendants who know that under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 68 a plaintiff who rejects a rule 68 offer and subsequently recovers an
amount less than or equal to the offer will forfeit post-offer attorney's fees may make intentionally
low offer to bluff plaintiff's lawyer into settlement); Miller, An Economic Analysis of Rule 68, 15 J.
LEGAL STUD. 93, 111-12 (1986) (rule shifts range of settlement to favor defendant, thus defendant
will offer lower settlement); Priest, Regulating the Content and Volume of Litigation: An Economic
Analysis, 1 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 163, 170-71 (1982) (defendant's offer lower because of decrease in
cost of litigation); Rowe, Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
at 139, 166-68 Winter 1984 (fee shifting device will operate as disincentive and parties will be less
likely to settle).
104. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.5, at 524 (3d ed. 1986) (parties will
litigate only if optimistic about the outcome); Rowe, supra note 103, at 156 n.71 (probability of shift
in fees compared with probability of winning adds another element of disagreement between parties);
Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allo-
cation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 56-57 (1982) (whether plaintiff decides to go to trial
depends upon his evaluation of chances of winning). This devotion to strategic behavior in litigation
may be a distinctly American phenomenon, from which even our supposed cousins, the British,
depart. See Alexander, The History of the Law as an Independent Profession and the Present English
System, in THE LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 47, at 1, 16-17 (describing
cooperative attitude about discovery manifested by English attorneys). Indeed, even in America,
some leading advocates may attach more importance to cooperation and less importance to games-
manship. See, eg., Friend, The Verdict on Arthur Liman, ESQUIRE, Jan. 1989, at 67, 74 (according
to his partner, one noted litigator believes that "'you get more in the long run by being candid' ").
105. Social costs include the chilling effect and public burden problems discussed supra notes 70-
100 and accompanying text, as well as the cost of using courts. See Shavell, supra note 104, at 71
(social costs include public administration expenses resulting from operation of courts, as well as
legal costs for litigants).
106. See J. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY (1981) (discussing recourse to litigation as
cultural addiction of Americans). But see Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Impli-
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plays the social benefits of cooperation. Social benefits are minimal if only the
few and eccentric seek to produce them. They are contingent on aggregate ef-
fects that require the assent and participation of masses of combatants in dispa-
rate disputes. When this assent is lacking, it seems futile to be a pioneer.
This subsection examines the lawyer's obligation to counsel the client, and
herself, regarding both of these problems. The first part of the subsection deals
with the role of counseling in developing trust between parties to a particular
dispute, and in ensuring that a settlement is not skewed unfairly toward one of
the disputants. The second part deals with counseling regarding a party's rela-
tionship with every other similarly positioned party-every other plaintiff or de-
fendant-in society, and with the need to act for society's benefit even if all
others similarly situated act only for themselves.
a. Policy Counseling as Benefitting Both Parties to a Specific Dispute
The two principal areas of counseling about policy identified in this Arti-
cle-the chilling effect and public burden problems-tend, as the Article has
indicated, to apply mainly to plaintiffs and defendants, respectively. In a given
dispute, overzealous action by the plaintiff may trigger a chilling effect on the
worthwhile, as well as wrongful, activities of defendants. Callous behavior by the
defendant may result in the public being obliged to provide resources to an ag-
grieved or disadvantaged plaintiff while the defendant escapes her own obliga-
tion. If the parties understood this complementary relationship between their
respective policy problems, they could, if they wished to consider the public
interest-and if their lawyers counseled them to do so-work together to
achieve a result that minimized both effects. Unfortunately, cooperation in the
real world faces certain basic obstacles.
A central difficulty with gaining acknowledgment of and action on each of
these problems from the plaintiff and defendant (or prospective plaintiff and de-
fendant) in a particular dispute is that each party will worry about being played
for a patsy if the other party chooses to view the dispute solely in terms of naked
self-interest. Mental health policy furnishes an illustration of the situation. Pa-
tients and their advocates desire better institutional conditions. They are unwill-
ing to mediate or moderate their desires without some concession and
acknowledgment of their interests by the state. This is true even if patients and
advocates understand that insisting on better institutional conditions will, at
some point, promote the state's exit from the mental health business.
By the same token, the state and its advocates may be unwilling to give the
patients everything that the patients desire. This is true even though the state
understands that if it declines to improve conditions, it will not only inflict harm
cations of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986) (expressing skepticism about supposed inclination of plaintiff's lawyers
to litigate clearly meritless cases vigorously); Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1087-90 &
n.41 (1984) (discussing impact of pressures for settlement on vindication of rights of individuals and
disadvantaged); Margulies, supra note 26, at 429-30 (same); Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Pro-
cedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 510 (1986) (noting "empirical inaccuracy" of claim that
private damages actions are proliferating).
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on others and arguably treat patients without the regard that morality suggests
one must show to equals, but also will promote a waste of human resources
because of the languishing of patients who could engage in productive work if
conditions were improved. The state's intransigence guarantees, therefore, that
the public will continue to foot the bill for institutionalization of these patients.
Moreover, the state's exit option-refusing care to the mentally disabled outside
of institutions and limiting admission to those institutions-also creates a bur-
den on the public. Persons denied admittance to state institutions become a
burden on their families. If, as is often the case, families are uninterested,
uninvolved, or incapable, these persons become a burden on other levels of gov-
ernment, which must deal with their problems because of the state's default.107
Despite these costs, the state may well want to extract some concessions
from patient advocates, in the form of lowered expectations of better conditions,
before it will agree to act in a way that will reduce these public burdens. Law-
yers on both sides must effectively counsel their clients about the policy costs of
intransigence. Effective counseling on both sides will create the appropriate en-
vironment for agreement. Ineffective or haphazard counseling on the part of
either side will make an agreement difficult to reach.
b. Counseling About Each Party's Relationship to a Society That May
Not Seem to Follow This Article's Policy Prescriptions
Law reform in the institutional context discussed above, like the simplest
individual tort suit, also encounters obstacles to acting on policy from another
quarter: the perception that other people in society similarly situated to the
client will do better because they will ignore the dictates of sound policy and act
only for themselves.10 8 Patients or their advocates, for example, are likely to
read reports of similar disputes elsewhere. If patients seem to receive all or most
of what they want in those disputes, with the accompanying risk of chilling ef-
fects on hospital admissions, then it may seem unavailing and quixotic for pa-
tients in the instant dispute to give up a chance at similar improvements.10 9
The answer to this conundrum is, of course, that some party must be first.
107. An example is the problem of homelessness. Any manner of coping with homelessness-
establishing shelters or longer-term housing, seeking to enforce vagrancy statutes, but see Papachris-
tou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (striking down vagrancy statute as impermissibly vague),
"Greyhounding" the homeless by giving them a one-way bus ticket out of town, or leaving homeless
people unassisted on the street, which encourages panhandling and, occasionally, harassment of
passersby-involves use of public resources or imposition of costs on the public.
108. See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 216-18 (discussing common pool problems created when
people can undertake to secure individual advantage at expense of group); Calabresi & Melamed,
supra note 17, at 1106-10 (describing costs of arriving at collective decision to buy and sell property
consisting of many individually owned parcels); Michelman, supra note 64, at 1214 n.99 (formulat-
ing concept of "settlement costs," that is, costs created by bargaining over just compensation for
land condemned by the government).
This problem is magnified in the case of an individual tort suit. In such a case, there are mil-
lions of other parties in other suits, not merely dozens, scores, or even hundreds, as in the case of
institutional reform suits across the United States. The marginal impact of decisions in one tort case
likely will be miniscule. But see Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98
HARV. L. REv. 4, 12-14 (1984) (arguing the significance of marginal change).
109. This is especially true because there is no easy way to coordinate and control the actions of
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If all parties in all suits seek to free ride on the policy harm done by everyone
else,110 the harm will persist in perpetuity. 11' Requiring, not merely permitting,
lawyers to counsel their clients that they must be willing to be pioneers is an
initial step toward eliminating or minimizing policy costs. Requiring lawyers to
perform this counseling function serves the same purpose as government action
in any case of market failure: l 12 it compensates for the fact that large numbers
of parties cannot economically agree among themselves on the optimal course of
action for coping with social problems.
IV. CRITICISMS
A. Client Alienation
The above discussion has demonstrated that the virtues of this Article's
approach are substantial-more cooperation, more moral actions and decisions,
fewer psychological and policy costs. However, the approach also has pitfalls.
The most obvious criticism of the model advanced in this Article is that the
model will alienate clients and thereby strain the attorney-client relationship.
There is clearly some intuitive rightness to this point. Geoffrey Hazard urges
lawyers to forgo advice of a nonlegal character precisely because he notes that a
client may react indignantly when he perceives that his lawyer, who is supposed
to be in his corner, is judging him."
13
This alienation could have unfortunate consequences. First, clients might
become less willing to share confidences with their lawyers, out of fear of being
judged as lacking moral or policy sense. Second, clients might seek to bypass
lawyers altogether. A client could exclude lawyers from the "loop" of client
decisionmaking, by going bare-that is, without legal advice-or by consulting
others who perform certain advisory functions analogous to those performed by
lawyers without the annoying professional responsibilities that this Article's
all patients in every such dispute. See supra note 108. Therefore, the decisions of the patients and
their advocates in a given case will have only a marginal effect. Id.
If we depart from the realm of policy and reenter that of morality, we can classify as "resent-
ment" the feelings of those observing the gains achieved by parties to other disputes who decline to
cooperate and instead seek every last advantage. These other parties, by hypothesis, have cheated.
Similarly situated observers may experience resentment at the gains achieved, particularly because
these gains come ultimately at the expense of everyone else. Cf. J. RAWLS, supra note 35, at 533
(discussing resentment as moral feeling and comparing it to envy, which does not derive from a
reaction to other's wrongs, but rather only from a perception of the disparity between the goods
possessed by others and those possessed by the observer).
110. The free ride is also taken on the public's subsidy of the justice system itself. See Shavell,
supra note 104, at 59.
111. This is as true for individual tort suits as it is for institutional litigation. The tort suits, in
aggregate, have an impact at least equal to, if not greater than, the impact of institutional cases. The
attitude explored here is much like the attitude evinced by nonvoters. Nonvoters typically reason
that their vote will not make a difference. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 48, at 907. Again, if
everyone felt this way, an electoral system would be unable to function. The system works, even in
part, because about half of the people still care enough to vote.
112. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 17, at 1115-24 (discussing market failure manifested
by pollution produced by factory, when neither factory nor customers of factory pay for costs of
pollution).
113. See G. HAZARD, supra note 6, at 147-48. Cf. Friend, supra note 104, at 69-70 (famed
litigator displays in his office the words of Isaiah: "Fear thou not, for I am with thee.").
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model would impose on attorneys. 114
These objections ultimately fail to persuade because of two factors: the na-
ture of the lawyer's role and the paucity of effective exits from recourse to law-
yers by clients. Clients go to lawyers because they have questions or problems.
Effective managing of those problems requires candor with one's lawyer. The
possibility of unwelcome moral or policy advice'1 5 from the lawyer does not
114. Consultants might be one source of such advice. Indeed, many law firms currently have
affiliated consulting services to deal with economic problems experienced by their clients. See Jones,
The Challenge of Change: The Practice of Law in the Year 2000, 41 VAND. L. Rv. 683, 688-92
(1988). If implementation of this Article's model yielded a chilling effect on clients' interest in turn-
ing to lawyers, arguably consulting firms could fill the vacuum.
115. The use of the word "unwelcome" implies that the client will resent the lawyer's counsel
outside of strictly legal areas. There is some psychological truth to the idea that clients want and
expect their lawyer to focus on their problems, rather than venturing into commentary on the ills of
third parties or society in general. See D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 6, at 173 (client wants
lawyer to empathize with client's difficulties). A comment on the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct permits a client to shut off the flow of nonlegal advice, if the client is "experienced in legal
matters." ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 110 (1987). Under this Article's approach, the client
does not have that power.
The client's lack of ability to shut off the socially concerned attorney is not free of costs. Mak-
ing the right to receive advice on nonclient interests inalienable compromises the client's autonomy.
When the client must listen and discuss moral, psychological, and policy issues with her lawyer, she
loses the ability to do something else with her time. Moreover, if she actually must bargain with the
attorney over the social effects of legal decisions, on pain of the lawyer withdrawing from the case,
her autonomy interest endures further strain. Cf. B. SPINOZA, ETHICS (1677), discussed in Luban,
Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 454, 461-66 (true autonomy involves con-
sideration of values, not just short-term interests); Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV.
717 (1987) (asserting that true autonomy involves not just the client's inclinations, but also an oppor-
tunity to make decisions in light of all possibly relevant information); Simon, supra note 5, at 52-61
(in name of client autonomy, lawyers impute legalistic ends to clients that may diverge from clients'
own goals). See generally M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975)
(positing lawyer's role as morally good because traditional conception of allegiance to client safe-
guards client autonomy); Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client
Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976) (same); supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (discussing
categorical imperatives).
The counseling required under this Article's approach is not only meant to vindicate the client's
decisionmaking capacity, but is also intended to benefit society. This benefit accrues even if the
client in fact experiences some reduction in autonomy. Within certain boundaries, under this Arti-
cle's approach, the infringement of individual prerogatives on behalf of group norms is permissible.
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 17, at 1111-15 (discussing society's interest in outlawing slav-
ery even if, in theory, an individual could make completely knowing and voluntary decision to en-
slave himself for a price); see also supra notes 10-13 & 46 and accompanying texts (describing how
nonpublic deliberation by lawyers and clients can yield results that public entities like legislatures
and courts would reach if transaction costs did not impede these entities' flexibility); cf. Kennedy,
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981) (discussing
indeterminacy and the fundamentally political, subjective character of group tastes and preferences
that might override individual choices).
Of course, one might disagree with some of the areas of counseling, particularly in the policy
realm, set out in this Article. The policy recommendations clearly do have a particular political
perspective. They assume some kind of market economy and political conditions roughly congruent
with those of a liberal democracy. Those impatient with such a regime might quarrel profoundly
with the recommendations made in this Article regarding policy. See, e.g., R. UNGER, KNowL-
EDGE AND POLITICS (1975) (urging discarding of liberalism in favor of communitarian ethos of
shared values); Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639 (1981)
(arguing that the ABA's rules are unable to resolve the problems inherent in liberalism); New Legal
Formalism, supra note 19 (arguing that legal professionalism should be abandoned if the value of
individuality is tb be taken seriously); cf. Frankel, Why Does Profesor Abel Work at a Useless Task?,
59 TEX. L. REV. 723, 729 (1981) (expressing doubts about the feasibility of a radical departure from
the liberal capitalist model in the United States).
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change the need for or advantage of candor.1 16 Moreover, because of the nature
of rules governing the practice of law, parties concerned about the legal conse-
quences of actions or decisions must turn to lawyers as virtually the "only game
in town." 117 Unless the various levels and units of government charged with
monitoring or enforcing the law wither away, or substantive rights and remedies
shrink to the point at which private parties have no incentive to invoke the law
to combat a perceived wrong, the need for legal advice and assistance is likely to
remain constant or to expand. Exits for disgruntled clients are limited. Clients
will have to tolerate counseling on the interests of nonclients if they wish to
secure the benefits that lawyers bring.
1 18
116. The advantage of candor might be reduced if lawyers were required to counsel clients not
only about the moral and policy consequences of legal decisions, but also to disclose all actions of
clients that might conflict with moral or policy norms. Compare Lynch, The Lawyer As Informant,
1986 DUKE L.J. 491, 521-23, 527-32 (arguing that requiring disclosure of wrongdoing in various
contexts can damage interpersonal relationships) with Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal
View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031 (1975) (advancing model based on lawyers' disclosure of all relevant
facts to court). Such a requirement would eviscerate the attorney-client privilege. See Freedman,
Judge Frankel's Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060 (1975); Uviller, The Advocate, The
Truth, and Judicial Hackles: A Reaction to Judge Frankels Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1071-74
(1975). Loss of the attorney-client privilege might deter clients from seeking legal advice, especially
if the price of disclosure of the client's actions would be civil or criminal sanctions, or even the
disapproval of the community. The chilling effect of such sanctions might make a client undertake
resolution of her legal problems on her own. This Article, however, does not suggest such a radical
step.
117. See Abel, supra note 115, at 653-67 (asserting that the regulation of the legal profession is
designed, in large part, to stifle competition).
118. Another related drawback that the approach advanced in this Article could yield is the exit
of lawyers themselves, or the diversion of those otherwise interested in studying law, because of the
burdens of moral and policy judgment that the approach entails. See, e.g., G, HAZARD, supra note
6, at 147 (quoting an unnamed participant in symposium on professional responsibility as asking,
with reference to counseling the client about policy and morality, "Who the hell are you to tell him
what he ought to do?"). Those who enter the law to escape the need for moral and policy judgments
and comfort themselves with the seeming neutrality and positivist, "just the facts" patina of advo-
cacy, see Simon, supra note 5, at 39-42, could be scared off by an emphasis on moral and policy
values. Cf. Friend, supra note 104, at 69-70 (drawing distinction between litigator Arthur Liman's
practice, which is oriented toward representation of commercial clients, his family life, and occa-
sional spells as a member of or counsel for various government investigatory bodies, such as the
Senate Iran-Contra Committee and the New York State Attica Commisssion). Some might view the
apparent neutrality of the law as a benefit. Cf Kennedy, supra note 10, at 777 (faith placed in
judicial neutrality would be misplaced); Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal The-
ory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 45 (1984) (notion of judicial neutrality is both supported and rejected by the
concepts of determinacy and objectivity); Simon, supra note 5, at 36 (pervasive "ideology of advo-
cacy" rationalizes lawyers' refusal to be bound by norms that he considers binding on others; funda-
mental to this "ideology" is the prescription that the lawyer remain detached from the purposes of
his client); New Legal Formalism, supra note 19, at 553 (the law is, in fact, political); cf. Alfieri, supra
note 92, at 660-65 (law is not neutral but instead embodies principles of status quo, particularly
belief in capitalism and liberal democratic values). Under this view, law's neutrality is a kind of
refuge from the irking necessity of moral choices that characterizes much of the rest of life. Cf. J.P.
SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS 553-56 (1956) (arguing that persons must accept responsibility
for choices in the world). Arguably, the neutrality of law complements, rather than conflicts with,
the need for such choices in other aspects of existence. But see Kronman, supra note 19, at 863-73
(practice of law is good in and of itself precisely because it develops capacity for judgment). An even
more conspicuous reason to fear the exit of lawyers if the model put forward in this Article were
adopted would be the possible loss of income that lawyers might experience. Many lawyers might be
reluctant to charge clients for the nonlegal advice suggested here. Many clients might be unwilling
to pay. The result could be that lawyers would end up donating counseling time, as a kind ofpro
bono project. While many lawyers do pro bono work, see, e.g., D. ROTHMAN & S. ROTIMAN, supra
note 80, at 325, 331, 333 (describing the pro bono participation of law firm in endeavor to improve
conditions at Willowbrook, an institution for the mentally retarded), many lawyers resent attempts
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B. Manipulation of Clients
Another criticism of the approach taken in this Article is that it would
promote greater manipulation of clients by lawyers.1 19 This criticism has bite,
however, only if one equates manipulation with influence. 120 Under this Arti-
cle's approach, some lawyers will have to adopt a more activist and comprehen-
sive mode of counseling focusing on nonlegal and nonclient interests. Clearly,
these lawyers may enjoy increased influence over a client. 12 1 Such influence,
however, could produce positive effects on the attorney-client relationship, sup-
plementing positive effects for third parties and for society. These improved
effects on relationships between lawyers and clients would contrast with the
to mandatepro bono activities. See, eg., Fried, supra note 115, at 1076-80 (lawyer has moral right to
choose cases as he pleases, including according to who can pay for her services). Requring counsel-
ing that lawyers would end up subsidizing could, consistent with the chilling effect problem dis-
cussed earlier, discourage people from starting or continuing in the practice of law.
The chilling effect, however, might be washed out by positive reaction to the greater role for
lawyers in the areas of morality and policy. See, e.g., Wasserstrom, supra note 47, at 14-15; Wolf,
Ethics, Legal Ethics, and the Ethics of Law, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 14, at 38, 52-54. In
addition, some people might embrace the opportunity to make the practice of law part of, instead of
separate from, the need for moral choice confronted in other aspects of life. See Eshete, Does a
Lawyer's Character Matter?, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 14, at 280-84 (noting the desirabil-
ity of lawyers retaining a good character); Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55
N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 76-81 (1980) (same). See generally R. DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE (1986) (dis-
cussing idea of law as integrity, that is, as system striving for harmony between legal entitlements
and remedies and best view of moral requirements).
119. For discussions of manipulation, see Ellmann, supra note 115; Ellmann, Manipulation By
Client and Context: A Response to Professor Morris, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1003, 1004-06 (1987); Mor-
ris, supra note 5, at 783-85.
120. See Morris, supra note 5, at 800 n.78.
121. This is particularly true in cases in which the lawyer seeks to control the nature of the
client's action or decision by threatening to withdraw from representation if the client does not
conform to the lawyer's wishes. This kind of persuasion may result in inequitable application of this
Article's approach. As was noted earlier, lawyers following this approach are permitted but not
required to withdraw representation. As a result, lawyers may exercise their option to withdraw
only with regard to certain types of clients, particularly poor or unpopular ones. Cf. Wolfram, supra
note 48, at 215-16 (citing danger that heightened obligations on the part of lawyers to defer to moral
considerations will create pretext for refusal to handle unpopular matters). Wealthy clients will
presumably be able to pay enough to make their lawyers think twice about exercising the option to
withdraw.
This prospect may be somewhat less chilling than it initially appears. First, one area of possible
abuse is eliminated by this Article's exclusion of criminal defense from those areas where withdrawal
is permissible. Second, lawyers outside of the criminal defense arena have little reason to bully their
clients into accepting a settlement by threatening to withdraw unless the settlement in some way
reflects the possible return on the claim at trial. In contingency tort cases, for example, the lawyer's
fee is keyed to the amount of her client's recovery. A lawyer who knows that a case is good for
approximately $100,000 at trial has little incentive to settle the case for $5,000, assuming a relatively
strong case on liability. Cf Margulies, supra note 26, at 439-40 (difficulty of accurately estimating
amount of recovery). The bullying described above will not occur in such situations. If, on the other
hand, the proposed settlement is for $100,000, but the client firmly believes, against the lawyer's best
advice, that she has a chance at $5,000,000, threat of withdrawal may well occur to get the client to
accept the offer. This outcome, however, does not injure the client's pocketbook interests in any
way. Indeed, it helps the client's pocketbook by getting the client to accept a sure $100,000 instead
of assuming the risk, which always exists with a factfinder whose decisions are not known in ad-
vance, see J. RAWLS, supra note 35, at 86 (discussing dice game as model for "pure procedural
justice"), that the client will end up getting nothing after trial. See Simon, supra note 40, at 1128
n.97 (arguing that ends ofjustice are served when a client is persuaded to relinquish claim lacking in
absolute merit, or merit relative to other cases that the lawyer could handle).
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damage done to those relationships by the manipulation traditionally practiced
by the legal profession.
Manipulation, as this Article defines it, ana as the legal profession has re-
fined it, is distinct from influence. Manipulation is the process through which a
lawyer invokes pretenses or neglects to disclose material facts to persuade the
client to decide on a specific course of action. Influence is the process by which
the lawyer uses the expression of sincere concerns, possibly coupled with the
open application of leverage in the form of a threat to withdraw from representa-
tion, to shape a client's decisions. Both manipulation and influence compromise
the client's autonomy to some degree, but influence is healthy for the attorney-
client relationship because it eschews the pretense that typifies manipulation.
The core pretense of traditional legal practice is that, absent any conflicts
between the interests of specific clients,1 22 the attorney generally will have no
interests that conflict with those of a client in any particular matter. Actually,
the attorney often faces generic conflicts between zealously representing a given
client and conducting a viable law practice. The lawyer who works too hard on
one client's case risks forfeiting his investment in other cases. This trade-off is
stark in a high volume practice. 123 To cope with the conflict, the lawyer to
manipulate the client into agreeing to settle when the lawyer believes additional
work will cost the lawyer more than he will gain from the incremental increase
in recovery that the additional work would produce.
124
The classic case of manipulation in legal practice involves persuading a cli-
ent to settle a case by assuring him that settlement is the only course of action
that makes legal sense and that benefits the client. In some cases, however, set-
tlement at a given point will not maximize the client's recovery, even though it
may not work a palpable injustice. The client could reject certain settlement
offers with minimal risk of losing the entire case. Accepting such an offer possi-
bly could prevent the client from winning much more at trial, even if the likeli-
hood of a higher award is sufficiently small to discourage the attorney, because
she must front the cost of continued work on the matter.
Settling in this situation is in the attorney's best interest, but not the cli-
122. For discussion of specific conflicts between clients' interests, see G. HAZARD, supra note 6,
at 69-86. See also United States v. Truglio, 493 F.2d 574, 579 (4th Cir. 1974) (discussing possible
conflicts precipitated by same lawyer's representation of multiple defendants in one case); Alsehuler,
The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1210-11 (1975) (same); Green,
supra note 28 (same); Green, "Through a Glass, Darkly: How the Court sees Motions to Disqualify
Criminal Defense Lawyers, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1201 (1989) (same).
123. See D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 95-99 (1974); Alfieri,
supra note 92, at 685-86; Alschuler, supra note 122, at 1210-24; Blumberg, The Practice of Law as
Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, LAW & Soc'Y REV., June 1967, at 15;
Schneyer, supra note 47, at 1544-45. The lawyer also risks forfeiting or prejudicing the interests of
the other clients. Avoiding such prejudice is itself a moral or policy good that the lawyer must bring
to the attention of each of his clients. A utilitarian analysis, at least, would suggest that achieving
passable results for many clients is superior to achieving an optimal result for one client and failing
miserably in helping others. See Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,
in J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM AND OTHER WRITINGS 33-77 (1974) (proposing principle that
achieving happiness for many outweighs needs of few); see also supra note 121 (discussing why
lawyer's pressure on poor client to settle will not work injustice on client).
124. See Burt, supra note 26, at 1021.
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ent's. It seems doubtful, however, that many attorneys will be sufficiently
scrupulous to explain that the attorney's interest in settling at the offered
amount exceeds that of the client, resulting in a conflict of interest that should
affect the way the client views the attorney's advice. Because of the potency of
modes of persuasion centering on the client's interests, 125 the lawyer may be able
to persuade the client to settle.
The appproach taken in this Article would require disclosure of and coun-
seling about such generic conflicts. This counseling would open the client's eyes
to the mixed allegiances of the lawyer instead of permitting the lawyer to phrase
options seductively in terms of the best interests of the client.126 The emphasis
required under this Article's approach on nonlegal and nonclient interests in
settlement would reduce the role of seductive invocation of client self-interest by
the lawyer. Instead of encouraging the client's corrosive suspicion that the law-
yer has an agenda besides the client's, the approach taken in this Article would
mandate full discussion of that agenda, clearing the way for a more open, hon-
est, and wide-ranging dialogue between attorney and client.
127
C. Rules Versus Discretion
Critics of this Article's model who are satisfied by these answers to
problems of client alienation and lawyer manipulation may nonetheless have lin-
gering doubts about other aspects of a model based on rules. Commentators
possessing these doubts have advanced the arguments that making lawyers fol-
low rules is somehow undignified, 128 out of keeping with the spirit of duty to
society that underlies the rules, 129 a crutch that discourages development of true
lawyerly judgment, 130 or just plain out of date. 131
125. See Ellmann, supra note 115, at 733-53 (discussing client-centered approach ofD. BINDER
& S. PRICE, supra note 6).
126. Reference to the client may not be the only manner of manipulation. Cf. Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (incriminating statement by suspect not involuntary under fifth amend-
ment when police officers persuade suspect to identify location of gun used in crime by discussing
among themselves, in suspect's presence, possibility that gun left on the street could be picked up
accidentally by a disabled child at a school nearby).
127. This is particularly true if, as Professor Burt suggests, clients listen to attorneys' legal ad-
vice with a nagging sense of distrust which the client may never acknowledge to the lawyer, but
which can color the client's subsequent perception of the relationship. See Burt, supra note 26, at
1019-20.
128. The notion that rules reduce professionals to undignified and meaningless recitation of legal
jargon manifests itself in the occasional comparison of rules governing attorneys and clients to Mi-
randa warnings. See, e.g., Legality and Welfare, supra note 19, at 1231-32; The Role of Rules, supra
note 7, at 1011-12; cf. Johnson v. Hall, 605 F.2d 577, 581-82 (1st Cir. 1979) (asserting that defendant
with criminal record had absorbed knowledge of Miranda rights sufficiently from past experience to
make voluntary inculpatory statement without Miranda warnings in instant prosecution); Simon,
supra note 5, at 57 n.65, 88-89 (hypothesizing that clients imbibe knowledge of Miranda and other
rights through adversarial ethos of American legal culture).
129. See Cox, supra note 47, at 62-63; Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65
TEX. L. REV. 963, 973 (1987) ("authors ... of [the Model Rules of Professional Conduct] have
rooted out both the language and the discipline of ethical reasoning").
130. See Kronman, supra note 19, at 874-76 (expressing fears about pervasiveness in contempo-
rary society of forces of Weberian rationalization, which value certainty and predictability above
exercise of Aristotelian practical wisdom).
131. William Simon has argued that rules in professional responsibility should give way to the
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These criticisms, while not entirely lacking in substance, do not rebut the
case for rules. The notion that rules are out of keeping with the altruistic per-
spective that lawyers should adopt merges with the idea that rules are beneath
the dignity of lawyers. The answer to both cavils is essentially the same: rules
are necessary precisely because altruism and dignity have failed to demonstrate
that rules are unnecessary. Altruism and dignity do not readily adapt them-
selves to the market arrangements governing most legal practice. 132 Even if
they did, flaws in inference and perception still might create pervasive social
costs. Establishing rules sacrifices some superficial measure of dignity to pro-
mote what philosophers see as an important attribute of a dignified life-the
capacity to deliberate about human problems and potential.
133
A body of rules need not be a crutch that discourages development of in-
dependent lawyerly judgment. Indeed, a virtue of using rules in counseling a
client about nonlegal and nonclient interests is that rules tend to focus debate in
areas in which discussion has been vague and amorphous. 134 A soupgon of pre-
cision may promote crystallized consideration of values and situations in this
setting, which traditionally has received little concrete attention.
It is also difficult to see such deliberation as obsolete. If deliberation and the
use of practical judgment sometimes seem outmoded and redolent of the gentil-
ity of earlier eras, it is because rules have in some areas preempted the field. 135
This development, for better or worse, hardly demonstrates that rules them-
selves are outdated. The real choice may be not between establishing rules or
letting lawyers discover pathways to the public interest on their own, but be-
discretionary interpretive approach that he views as more characteristic of modern judicial decision
making. See Simon, supra note 40, at 1119-23 (citing rejection of plain meaning rule and adoption of
purposive interpretation in Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) as model for modern
understanding of judicial role). Elsewhere, however, Simon has contrasted this discretionary ap-
proach with modem approaches to administration of public benefit programs, which tend to rely on
rules and routines. See Legality and Welfare, supra note 19.
132. Market failure is the primary justification for the imposition of rules. See Leubsdorf, supra
note 27, at 1035-45 (describing premises, operation, and problems of "public utility" model of pro-
fessional reform).
133. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 48, at 164-73 (discussing importance of practical wisdom and
its status as a virtue); Kronman, supra note 19 (applying Aristotelian idea of practical wisdom to
practice of law).
134. See Schneyer, Professional Responsibility Casebooks and the New Positivism: A Reply to
Professor Chemerinsky, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 943, 956-57 (discussing usefulness of rules as
device for encouraging debate among students).
135. The growth of statutes reflects this trend. See G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN
LAW 95 (1977) (discussing the "orgy of statute making" in modem American law). For an argu-
ment that the growth of statutes that rapidly become obsolete requires judicial action to nullify
outdated legislation, see G. CALABRESi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 163-66
(1982). See also Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987)
(describing more moderate version of Calabresi's model, emphasizing updating statutes when their
language does not rule out such a revision); Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541 (1988) (positing task of statutory interpretation as collaboration be-
tween courts and legislature on formulation of political values); Simon, supra note 40, at 1115-19
(discussing desirability of individual lawyers nullifying unjust legal requirements by ignoring them in
cases in which clients will not get caught). For critiques of Calabresi's proposal, see Estreicher,
Judicial Nullification: Guido Calabresi's Uncommon Common Law for a Statutory Age, 57 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1126 (1982); Weisberg, The Calabresian JudicialArtist: Statutes and the New Legal Process,
35 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1982). For a discussion of Calabresi's method as applied to the housing
problems of persons with mental disabilities, see Margulies, supra note 80, at 379-87.
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tween shaping rules that encourage discovery of those pathways or permitting
the rules of the market and human inference to continue to govern in their own
careless fashion.
V. CONCLUSION
The legal profession has always presented itself as dedicated to public ser-
vice. Often, however, such dedication is suppressed by market forces or con-
founded by cognitive heuristics and biases. This Article suggests some ground
rules for discussing the public good and the good of identifiable third parties
with clients. These rules should reduce the manipulation of clients by lawyers,
Which currently characterizes many attorney-client relationships. The promise
of this approach is that it may precipitate discussion, debate, and deliberation
within the profession, among clients, between attorneys and clients, 136 and in
society about the role of lawyers and the consequences of legal actions and deci-
sions. Deliberation on these issues has been viewed since the birth of the Repub-
lic as a special province of lawyers. 137 Indeed, commentators often have cited
deliberation as a central end of a republican form of government. 138 The ability
to deliberate effectively is defined here as the ability to practice simultaneously
process both sympathy for a client's cause and detachment from that cause.
This is essential to the individual practice and cultivation of practical judg-
ment.13 9 Effective deliberation will minimize the unforeseen harm that may
flow from the possible triumph of the client's cause.
The problem with these paeans to deliberation, as applied to the practice of
law and interaction with clients, is that they describe an ideal of excellence,
rather than prescribing any route for reaching the ideal. Lawyers imbibe a posi-
tivist, just-the-facts attitude from their daily work with drafting, counseling, ne-
gotiation, or coping with imminent or anticipated problems of proof in an
adversary system. The description of excellence becomes an object on a man-
tlepiece, to be admired and gazed at nostalgically, rather than a basis for action
in the world.
This Article offers one blueprint for deliberation. Obliging a client to con-
sider, for instance, whether the harm her action visits upon others is justified by
a larger gain to society, precipitates debate about the larger canvas painted by
136. The discussion can take many forms, depending on the temperament of the lawyer and the
client. For models of dialogue between lawyer and client, see Alfieri, supra note 92, at 698-703
(urging lawyer to discuss with client sociopolitical and class context of legal disputes); Neumann, A
Preliminary Inquiry Into the Art of Critique, 40 HASTINGs L.J. 725 (1989) (modeling Socratic dia-
logue between teacher and student that may be adapted to other purposes).
137. See THE FEDERALIST No. 35, at 220 (A. Hamilton) (Wesleyan University Press ed. 1961)
("With regard to the learned professions, . . . they truly form no distinct interest in society.., and
according to their situations and talents will be. indiscriminately the objects of the confidence and
choice of each other and of other parts of the community."); A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 242-54 (1956); Gordon, supra note 2, at 14-16; Luban, supra note 2, at 718-20.
138. See, eg., Popkin, supra note 135, at 565-67; Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in
Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543, 552-55 (1986); Sunstein, Interest Groups in Ameri-
can Public Law, 38 STAN L. REv. 29, 30-31 (1985).
139. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (citing views of Aristotle and modem gloss of
Kronman).
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individual decisions. Deliberation about the chilling effect or public burden cre-
ated by assertion of a legal right accomplishes the same purpose.
While this Article encourages deliberation, it does not advocate the whole-
sale relinquishing of legal rights or any other substantive outcome of such delib-
eration. In this sense the Article's approach sports all of the traditional
weaknesses of a process-based model rooted in liberal or republican notions of
dialogue. 140 Those sufficiently confident to espouse a more substantive vision
may not find satisfaction in this model. Their perspectives are vital, however, in
formulating other bases for deliberation to supplement or substitute for those
advanced here. This deliberation may shed some light on the goals all envision
for the legal process.
140. See B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 349-78 (1980) (describing
furtherance of dialogue as ultimate desideratum of liberalism); see also Sunstein, supra note 138, at
30 (discussing republican values); cf. R. UNGER, supra note 115, at 6-7 (criticizing liberalism as sub
rosa ratification of substantive values underlying status quo).
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